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INTRODUCTION 
Probably few legal devices are as confusing to an efficiency-oriented 
lawyer, yet have comparably widespread1 and frequent2 uses in our 
commercial life, as security interests.  In the early 1980s, Professor Allen 
Schwartz introduced the “puzzle of secured debt,” where secured lending 
was portrayed as a zero-sum game, maybe even with some net costs.3  
Since then, plenty of attempts have been made in the legal academia to 
justify the efficiency of secured debts, though seemingly with only limited 
success.4  At the same time, the potential to redistribute wealth from certain 
 
 1.  Virtually every country in the world recognizes at least some security devices, and 
according to the London attorney Phillip R. Wood, about eighty English-based states allow 
a universal monopolistic security over all assets of the debtor.  LYNN M. LOPUCKI & 
ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 410 (4th ed. 2003) (citing 
PHILIP R. WOOD, MAPS OF WORLD FINANCIAL LAW 24-25 (1997)).  
 2.  Professor Listokin’s recent study shows that in the U.S., for firms not subject to 
high risk of tort liabilities, about one-third of their debts are secured, though the ratio 
appears lower in the so-called “high-tort” firms.  Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to 
Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 1037, 1062-63 (2008).  
 3.  Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 
(1984) [hereinafter Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle]; see also Allen Schwartz, Security 
Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 
(1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Security Interests].  For the details of the puzzle, see infra 
note 14 and accompanying text. 
 4.  Important research by legal scholars on this subject has been conducted by, among 
others: Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Equity-Agency Solution]; F.H. Buckley, The 
Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986); David Gray Carlson, On the 
Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179 (1994); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. 
Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices 
Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021 (1994); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, 
Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Hideki 
Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2103 (1994); Saul 
Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 
(1982); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625 
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groups of unsecured creditors has evoked severe doubts about the 
desirability of the priority statuses conferred upon secured creditors in 
bankruptcy.  The most influential works expressing this concern are two 
articles co-authored by Professors Bebchuk and Fried at the eve of an 
overhaul of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.5 
This Article is inspired directly by the Bebchuk and Fried articles, 
which comprehensively questioned the efficiency of the bankruptcy 
priority awarded to secured claims.  The Article starts by pointing out an 
efficiency benefit of such priority largely unmentioned in the legal 
literature, including the Bebchuk and Fried articles.  Namely, the priority of 
secured debts undermines borrowers’ incentives to pursue excessively risky 
investment projects under certain circumstances.  However, this additional 
benefit also exposes two interrelated paradoxes pertaining to the welfare 
effects of secured claims with bankruptcy priority.  For one thing, the 
advantage of discouraging excessive risk-taking behaviors, and probably 
some other efficiency advantages too, rests exactly on the distribution 
effects of the priority enjoyed by secured lenders. 
For another, while the issuance of secured senior debts helps constrain 
overly-risky investment incentives in some contexts, it nevertheless 
promotes these kinds of incentives in others.  By identifying and 
elaborating on these paradoxes of secured lending,6 this Article contributes 
to the literature in two aspects.  First, it underlines the overshadowed 
function of secured lending in attenuating overinvestment incentives, which 
so far has been left out of the calculus when most legal scholars assess the 
efficiency of secured debts.  In particular, this study reminds us of the 
potential price of aggravated risk-taking behaviors if tort claims are 
entrenched with a superpriority status in bankruptcy,7 an issue barely 
 
(1997); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 645 (1992); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured 
Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1986) [hereinafter Scott, Relational Theory]; George G. 
Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 
(1992) [hereinafter Triantis, Secured Debt]; James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for 
Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984). 
 5.  Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of 
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, 
Uneasy Case 1]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority 
of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1279 (1997) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2]. 
 6.  To be more precise, these are the paradoxes arising from the priority of secured 
lending. 
 7.  For suggestions on granting tort creditors superpriority in bankruptcy, see, for 
example, Buckley, supra note 4, at 1406, 1417; David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort 
Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1646-49 (1991); Lynn M. LoPucki, The 
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brought up in the literature. 
Second, this Article also cautions the proponents of the secured credit 
priority system on the fragility of its presumed efficiency, which hinges 
substantially upon its distributional outcomes.  The paradoxes discussed 
below will challenge the efforts to buttress the priority of secured claims by 
qualifying the scope of potential victims of its distributional effects.  My 
discussion will show that the smaller the scope of the victims, the lower the 
significance of secured lending in boosting efficiency.  Essentially, this 
Article extends the logic underlying the “puzzle of secured debt” to the 
efficiency analysis of secured lending from a broader perspective.  
Although it is not aimed specifically at offering new solutions to the 
puzzle, this paper does seek to clarify misunderstandings in previous works 
following primarily the framework laid down by Professor Schwartz.8 
Theoretical studies on secured lending have gathered little attention 
since the late 1990s.  Yet this vein of studies may take on new importance 
in light of the recent surge of second lien loans in the capital market.9  
Article 9 has evidently exerted extensive influence abroad as well.  Many 
transitional economies in Eastern Europe actively took in the American 
style of non-possessory security interests in movable assets as they 
reformed their collateral regimes.10  China, in its new Property Law 
promulgated in 2007, officially acknowledged the security interests in 
current and after-acquired equipment and inventories.11  In 2004, Japan 
amended its law on the filing of personal property and accounts 
receivable,12 apparently to facilitate the creation of these assets’ security 
interests à la UCC.13  All these movements seem to be pressing for 
 
Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1913-14 (1994); Christopher M.E. 
Painter, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Creditor System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of 
Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1080-83 (1984).  
 8.  For the details of this framework, see infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 9.  See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 
671-75 (2010) (describing the robust market for second lien loans that has emerged in the 
past several years, in large part due to syndication of such loans and demand on the part of 
hedge funds).  
 10.  Rainer Haselmann, Katharina Pistor & Vikrant Vig, How Law Affects Lending, 23 
REV. FIN. STUD. 549, 553-60 (2010). 
 11.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wu Quan Fa [Property Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by Tenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective 
Oct. 1, 2007), art. 181. 
 12.  Dohsan Oyobi Saiken No Johto No Taikoh Yohken Ni Kansuru Minpoh No 
Tokureh Toh Ni Kansuru Hohritsu [Act on Special Provisions, etc. of the Civil Code 
Concerning the Perfection Requirements for the Assignment of Movables and Claims], Law 
No. 104 of 1998 (Japan). 
13.   Chieko Nohno, Saiken Johto No Taikoh Yohken Ni Kansuru Minpoh No Tokureh 
Toh Ni Kansuru Hohritsu No Yichibu Wo Kaisei Suru Hohritsu: Tehan Riyu [Reason for the 
Proposal of Amending the Act on Special Provisions, etc. of the Civil Code Concerning the 
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continuing inquiries into the welfare outcomes of secured debts. 
Below, Part I of this paper outlines the challenges to the efficiency of 
secured lending, especially when some creditors do not make adjustments 
in interest rates.  Part II reviews theories on the efficiency of secured 
lending and analyzes whether any of them lends support to a less uneasy 
case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy.  Part III fleshes out 
the two paradoxes of secured lending in terms of secured lending’s effects 
on borrowers’ overinvesting incentives.  Part IV considers some additional 
costs that need to be balanced against the efficiency benefits of secured 
lending.  Part V extends the paradoxical nature of secured lending to two 
other aspects of its efficiency effects: remedying underinvestment and 
saving in screening costs.   
I. NONADJUSTING CREDITORS AND THE DISTRIBUTIONAL 
EFFECTS OF SECURITY INTERESTS 
A. Distributional Effects of Secured Debt 
By obtaining a priority over unsecured creditors when the debtor 
becomes insolvent and unable to pay off all its debts, secured creditors can 
extract more from the bankruptcy estate than a pro rata rule would 
otherwise have allowed.  Thus, secured creditors are less vulnerable to the 
risk of the debtor’s failure, and will charge lower interest rates accordingly.  
However, more assets going to secured creditors means that fewer are left 
for unsecured creditors in the event of the debtor’s bankruptcy.  In other 
words, to the extent that secured creditors are more risk-resistant, 
unsecured creditors become more risk-vulnerable.  Therefore, if unsecured 
creditors can properly calculate the additional risk due to the existence of 
outstanding security interests, they will demand higher interests to 
compensate for it.  As a whole, any decrease in interest rates applicable to 
secured debts will likely be cancelled out by the corresponding increase in 
interest charges applicable to unsecured debts; hence, the total amount of 
interest the debtor has to pay stays constant.  Since issuing secured debts is 
costly, the now well-known “puzzle of secured debt” stands in the way of 
 
Perfection Requirements for the Assignment of Claims] (at the Committee of Judicial 
Affairs, House of Councillors, the National Diet of Japan, Nov. 2, 2004): 
[I]t has drawn great attention in recent years to create security interests in or 
securitize movables and claims for financing purposes . . . . Therefore, this 
amendment enables the public notice of the assignment of the movables and 
account receivables held by legal persons through filing, so as to facilitate the 
financing by enterprises using movables and claims. 
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any serious effort to advocate for the efficiency of secured lending.14 
However, the puzzle exists because of informed and adjusting 
unsecured creditors.  If these creditors do not adjust interest rates to reflect 
the incremented risk, debtors can well enjoy the benefit of secured 
lending’s reduced interest rates at the expense of unsecured creditors.  
Then, essentially, secured debt redistributes wealth from nonadjusting 
general creditors to the debtor.15  This kind of distributional effect has long 
been noted and has been used to explain the prevalence of secured lending 
in spite of certain potential empirical difficulties.16 
B. Presence of Nonadjusting Creditors 
Uninformed and nonadjusting creditors seem to exist.  Hence, the 
distributional effect of secured lending is not a mere hypothetical.  If the 
issuance of secured debts is mostly motivated by such a distributional 
effect, then the priority awarded to secured claims should be reconsidered 
since the negative externality suffered by nonadjusting creditors may 
encourage the debtor to undertake value-wasting investment projects.  In 
fact, this is the main argument against the priority of secured claims in 
bankruptcy raised by Professors Bebchuk and Fried.17  In particular, they 
 
 14.  Professor Schwartz listed four assumptions leading to this puzzle:  Creditors (i) can 
learn of and react to the existence of security; (ii) can calculate risks of default reasonably 
precisely; (iii) are risk-neutral; and (iv) have homogeneous expectations respecting default 
probabilities.  Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 7.  Because it is focused on the 
situation with nonadjusting creditors, this Article will not discuss the assumptions about 
risk-neutrality and homogeneous expectations.  For critiques on the efforts to resolve the 
puzzle by relaxing these two assumptions see id. at 22-24, 27-28; Schwartz, Continuing 
Puzzle, supra note 3, at 1062-66; Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 227-28. 
 15.  The term “nonadjusting creditor” was first introduced in Bebchuk and Fried’s 1996 
article, Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 864.  In a follow-up article 
published the following year, Bebchuk and Fried defined “nonadjusting creditors” as 
“creditors that do not adjust the terms of their loan to reflect the effect on them of the 
creation of security interests which, under full priority, completely subordinate the 
nonadjusting creditors’ claims in bankruptcy.”  Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra 
note 5, at 1293-94. 
 16.  See Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 30-33 (suggesting that such a 
distributional explanation incorrectly predicts the absence of security in cases when most of 
the creditors are aware of the security); James H. Scott Jr., Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and 
Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J. FIN. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Scott, Bankruptcy] (asserting that 
secured debt can be used to increase stockholder wealth); James H. Scott Jr., Bankruptcy, 
Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Reply, 34 J. FIN. 253 (1979) [hereinafter 
Scott, Reply] (verifying the claim that secured debt increases stockholder wealth). 
 17.  See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5 (challenging the idea that in 
bankruptcy a secured creditor should be entitled to his full claim before any payments are 
made to unsecured creditors); see also Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5 
(reaffirming the claim that priority regarding secured creditors in bankruptcy is basically 
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pinned down four categories of nonadjusting creditors: (i) private 
involuntary creditors, or tort creditors; (ii) governments as holders of tax 
and regulatory claims; (iii) voluntary creditors with small claims such as 
customers, employees, and trade creditors; and (iv) prior voluntary 
creditors extending credit on fixed terms.18  For involuntary creditors, 
nonadjustment may be a combined result of passive ignorance and inability 
to adjust.  On the other hand, for voluntary creditors with small claims, 
especially trade creditors, the failure to adjust interest rates in each 
transaction is more likely a rational choice, given the small amount of 
claims relative to the cost of adjustment. 
Nonadjusting creditors, however, are not necessarily hurt by the 
borrower’s inefficient investment decisions.  Trade creditors, for example, 
can charge an interest rate that, on average, fully compensates their risk of 
loss due to security interests, even if they do not adjust their interest rates in 
any specific transaction.19  Prior voluntary creditors, when properly 
anticipating the risk caused by subsequent secured debts, will set the 
interest rate of their loans to take this risk into account.  Put differently, the 
prior voluntary creditors can protect themselves through ex ante 
adjustments, and in those cases, rational borrowers would issue secured 
debts as anticipated.20  But there are also nonadjusting creditors who will be 
hurt by the use of security credits with priority.  Tort creditors are among 
the victims, as are the voluntary nonadjusting creditors who do not always 
deal with the debtor on terms that reflect the risk of security interests and 
 
inefficient). 
 18.  Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 882-91.  The presence of 
nonadjusting creditors, and tort creditors in particular, is widely noted in academic 
literature.  See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 4, at 1406 (stating that secured lending has 
distributional consequences for tort claimants); John Hudson, The Case Against Secured 
Lending, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 47 (1995) (arguing against secured lending due to its 
negative effects on credit markets and unsecured creditors); Leebron, supra note 7, at 1568  
(discussing the perverse effects of limited liability on tort claimants); LoPucki, supra note 7, 
at 1893 (noting that tort creditors’ unsecured status is involuntarily imposed on them).  
 19.  Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 886-87; Bebchuk & Fried, 
Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1313. 
 20.  Otherwise, prior voluntary creditors will receive a windfall gain.  Bebchuk and 
Fried admit that the prior voluntary creditors can make ex ante adjustments, but they 
emphasize that this will not stop the usage of security interests to “make the borrower better 
off by allowing it to ‘sell’ to the creditor bankruptcy value that would otherwise be enjoyed 
by these prior nonadjusting creditors.”  Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 
890-91.  In this context, the borrower is better off by issuing security debts, but only 
because it precludes the windfall gain that “would otherwise be enjoyed by” the prior 
voluntary creditors adjusting the interest rate in advance.  Id. at 891.  The prior voluntary 
creditors will not be exploited insofar as they appropriately anticipate the possibility of 
subsequent secured debts and set the interest rates accordingly.  See Scott, Reply, supra note 
16, at 258. 
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that cannot mitigate the risk by diversification, as can the debtor’s 
employees and customers.21 
Those creditors unhurt by secured debts are essentially not subject to 
the distributional effects, even if they do not adjust their interest rates per 
se.  Although their existence may help explain the use of secured debts, it 
should not change the efficiency implications of secured lending.  As this 
paper is concerned mainly about social efficiency, I define nonadjusting 
creditors in a narrower manner as creditors who, when unsecured, cannot 
increase interest rates to completely account for the extra risk caused by the 
attainment of security interests by other creditors.  In short, they are the real 
victims of the distributional effects created by secured lending. 
In contrast, an adjusting creditor is able to make such an increase in 
interest rates.  However, adjusting creditors are not perfectly informed 
either.  Professor Triantis distinguishes two types of information 
imperfections faced by lenders: 
(a) information asymmetry related to parameters of payoff 
distributions as they exist at the time the debt is issued, and (b) the lenders’ 
imperfect control over, and information about, decisions of the firm made 
between the time the debt is issued and its maturity, which may change the 
value of these parameters.22 
The adjusting creditors in this paper, unless stated otherwise, are 
assumed to have accurate information about the payoff distributions as they 
exist at the time of debt issuance, but imperfect control over and imperfect 
information about the borrower’s decision between the time of debt 
issuance and maturity. 
C. Inefficiencies Resulting from the Distributional Effect 
As Professor Carlson pointed out,23 the presence of nonadjusting 
creditors suffering a loss due to the use of secured debts with priority alone 
is insufficient to challenge the efficiency of secured lending, at least in the 
Kaldor-Hicks sense, because the gains accrued to the borrower may well 
offset or even exceed the loss.  The comparison between the magnitudes of 
such gains and losses, however, is inevitably an empirical task, and no 
decisive conclusion can be expected from theoretical arguments.  This said, 
 
 21.  Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1313-14.  But see Buckley, 
supra note 4, at 1407-09 (arguing that employees and customers are not likely to be 
substantially hurt). 
 22.  Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 233. 
 23.  See David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1635, 1665 (1998) (“To the extent that economic discourse concerns itself with the 
maximization of wealth, it does not concern itself with wealth transfer per se.”) 
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before meaningful empirical undertakings become possible, theoretical 
analyses are nonetheless worthwhile in terms of identifying the possible 
origins of costs and benefits.  Hence, in this Part I will first summarize the 
major efficiency costs opponents raise about the priority of security 
interests and then evaluate the theories regarding the efficiency benefits of 
this priority scheme in the next Part. 
1. Costs of Granting Security Interests as a Net Welfare Loss 
Sometimes the borrower will not change its investment decision 
regardless of whether a secured or unsecured loan is used.24  In these 
situations, the borrower will nonetheless choose secured lending purely to 
take advantage of the lower interest rate offered by a secured creditor.  This 
security interest clearly does not benefit society by any measure, as neither 
the probability of investment failure nor the borrower’s asset value in case 
of investment failure would differ were the lending unsecured.  However, 
the use of security interests itself is never free, and the resulting costs, 
externalized to nonadjusting creditors, becomes a net social welfare loss.25  
Professors Bebchuk and Fried identified three primary categories of such 
costs: “(1) ‘contracting costs’ – including the cost of negotiating and 
perfecting the security interest; (2) ‘enforcement costs’ – the costs of 
policing the collateral; and, perhaps most importantly, (3) ‘opportunity 
costs’ – the costs created when the security interest prevents the borrower 
from pursuing efficient activities.”26 
To this list we may add the increased cost of reorganization when the 
debtor is insolvent.  Because secured creditors have priority, they tend to 
prefer liquidation, which entails lower risk, even if reorganization may 
generate greater value to all parties involved as a whole.27  Secured 
creditors also tend to push through a speedy sale to promptly recover their 
investments at a price high enough to pay off secured credits, but often less 
 
 24.  See infra Part V Example 5 for an illustration of this situation. 
 25.  For a numeric illustration of such a case of net welfare loss, see Bebchuk & Fried, 
Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 896-97. 
 26.  Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 877. 
 27.  Listokin, supra note 2, at 1037, 1047.  For a general discussion about secured 
creditors liquidation preference, see Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate 
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on 
Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 106-07 
(1984).  However, with the increasingly active role of hedge funds in the secured loan 
market, this long-standing assumption may start to falter.  See Douglas Baird & Rasmussen, 
supra note 9, at 668-71 (discussing how the incentives of hedge funds differ from those of 
traditional banks in the case of debtor’s bankruptcy as secured lenders). 
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than the assets’ true worth,28 thus resulting in inefficient allocation of 
assets.  Furthermore, secured creditors are “uniquely placed to ‘hold up’” 
the reorganization negotiation to extract excess value because they lose 
little if the failure of negotiation leads to liquidation.29 
2. Increased Debtor Misbehaviors 
Debtors misbehave because their interests are not aligned with their 
creditors.  When free from control, debtors are ready to pursue any 
activities that make themselves better off at the creditors’ expense.  This is 
the well-known agency problem of debt financing.30 
The most frequently discussed form of debtor misbehavior in the law 
and economics literature on security interests is “overinvestment,” i.e., the 
debtor’s preference for higher-risk and higher-return projects even though 
these projects harm creditors by a larger margin than they benefit the 
debtor.31  This preference stems from the fact that the debtor will capture all 
of the additional return if the risky projects succeed while the creditors will 
bear the costs if they fail.32  Inspired by the overinvesting incentive, the 
debtor may take on a project with a negative net present value (NPV) in the 
absolute sense, or, roughly speaking, a project having an expected value 
lower than its cost.  Alternatively, the undertaken project can also be of a 
 
 28.  Douglas G. Baird, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 228 (5th ed. 2010). 
 29.  Listokin, supra note 2, at 1048. 
 30.  In discussing the agency problem of debt financing, I assume, as most writers on 
security interests do, that the debtor’s management full-heartedly serves its shareholders’ 
interests.  In other words, the agency problem of equity financing is assumed away.  By and 
large, the literature on secured lending is not concerned with the effects of security interests 
on equity financing.  Instead, perhaps implicitly, the agency cost of equity financing is taken 
as the precondition for the very existence of debt financing.  The only notable exception, to 
my knowledge, is Professor Adler, who believes that the efficiency of secured lending 
comes from the value it may add to the debtor’s non-management equity investors.  See 
Adler, Equity-Agency Solution, supra note 4, at 74-75.  Professor Levmore also mentioned 
the potential positive influence of secured credit on equity holders in an earlier article.  See 
Levmore, supra note 4, at 68-71 (discussing the monitoring value of secured credit).   
 31.  I use this term following Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 874.  
Some law and economics scholars use the term “risk-alteration” instead.  See, e.g., 
Levmore, supra note 4, at 52 (using the term “risk-alteration” to describe such behavior).  In 
financial literature, the term “asset substitution” is more often used to refer to roughly the 
same phenomenon.  Strictly speaking, however, asset substitution may be understood as a 
particular type of overinvestment.  See Buckley, supra note 4, at 1438 (describing asset 
substitution as the acquiring of a new, riskier asset by selling older, less risky assets). 
 32.  The overinvestment problem was first explained in Michael C. Jensen & William 
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 333-43 (1976).  For a formal discussion, see Richard C. 
Green & Eli Talmor, Asset Substitution and the Agency Costs of Debt Financing, 10 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 391 (1986). 
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negative NPV in a marginal sense, i.e., a project with a lower expected 
value net of its cost given the availability of more socially efficient 
projects.33  The quintessence of overinvestment is the discrepancy between 
the social and the debtor’s private interests given the possibility to 
redistribute wealth from creditors to the debtor.  This problem has been 
widely recognized by law scholars and illustrations abound in legal 
writings.34 
Another form of misbehavior that the debtor may engage in is “asset 
dilution,” which consists of taking assets out of the reach of creditors if the 
debtor eventually goes bankrupt.  Asset dilution can be socially inefficient 
when it reduces the debtor’s value more than the gains it passes on to the 
debtor’s shareholders.  The debtor’s incentive to remove assets originates, 
again, from the prospect that the creditors will bear the costs of such 
removal when the debtor fails.35 
Debtor misbehavior can be exacerbated in two ways when a secured 
debt is used in the presence of nonadjusting creditors.  First, secured 
creditors tend to charge lower interest rates.  But if unsecured creditors 
adjust interest rates to offset the worsened repayment prospect of their 
loans, the debtor’s overall cost of borrowing remains unchanged, so its 
incentive to borrow will not vary on the whole.  However, since 
nonadjusting creditors do not make such adjustment after the issuance of a 
secured debt, the total cost of borrowing declines as the debtor borrows on 
a secured basis.  Therefore, compared with a world disallowing secured 
lending, the debtor will be more willing to borrow if secured lending is an 
option.  Expanded reliance on debt financing, in turn, intensifies the 
debtor’s incentive to overinvest.36 
Second, although debtor misbehaviors can be restricted by creditors’ 
monitoring, and cost-effective monitoring reduces the agency costs 
 
 33.  Bezalel Gavish & Avner Kalay, On the Asset Substitution Problem, 18 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 21, 27 n.9 (1983). 
 34.  See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 4, at 1426-29 (illustrating that a firm which has 
issued debt has an incentive to choose a riskier investment because in assessing the value of 
the investment the firm considers the return on the investment minus the debt to be repaid); 
Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 2108-11 (illustrating how debt alters the expected return 
of an investment and how this creates an incentive to invest in riskier investments); Bebchuk 
& Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 873-75 (demonstrating how debt impacts the 
calculation for expected return). 
 35.  For a numerical example of asset dilution, see Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, 
supra note 5, at 874-75.  A third form of debtor misbehavior is “underinvestment.”  
Underinvestment bearing on security interests is also explored extensively, though perhaps 
incompletely, in the field of law and economics.  The thrust of this relationship becomes 
clearer when we better understand the connection between the priority of security interests 
and the overinvestment problem.  See infra Part VI A (discussing underinvestment). 
 36.  See infra Part IV.B. for details. 
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involved in debt financing, secured creditors will have less incentive to 
monitor because they are insulated from the negative effects of debtor 
misbehaviors insofar as the value of the collateral does not drop below the 
amount of their loans.37  In a competitive debt market absent nonadjusting 
creditors, reduced monitoring by secured creditors may well implicate 
intensified monitoring efforts by unsecured creditors.  The debtor then will 
demand an optimal level of monitoring as it bears the agency costs to the 
full extent.  Given the different incentives in monitoring brought about by 
secured and unsecured debts, and the uneven monitoring capabilities 
among creditors, the debtor should award security interests selectively to 
encourage optimal monitoring, thus minimizing the agency costs it is 
expected to bear.  Indeed, this idea is squarely embodied in the early efforts 
of identifying the efficiency of secured debts.38 
When the unsecured creditors do not adjust their monitoring efforts or 
interest rates as a consequence of the debtor’s grant of security interests, 
however, the issuance of secured debts simply decreases the total 
monitoring efforts by all creditors, and the probability of debtor 
 
 37.  Most commentators agree that security interests disincentivize creditors to monitor 
debtor misbehaviors when their loans are sufficiently secured.  See Adler, Equity-Agency 
Solution, supra note 4, at 89 (noting that because adequately secured creditors will receive 
full repayment despite firm mismanagement, secured creditors have no incentive to 
monitor); Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1317-18 (stating that an 
adequately secured creditor will have less incentive to engage in enforcement activity or 
adopt efficient covenants); Buckley, supra note 4, at 1440, 1443 (stating that secured 
creditors have little incentive to affirmatively monitor a debtor); Triantis, Secured Debt, 
supra note 4, at 244 (stating that secured creditors have an incentive to monitor assets acting 
as security and reduce any other monitoring).  But Professor Levmore posits that secured 
creditors are nevertheless likely to engage in asset-specific monitoring.  See Levmore, supra 
note 4, at 55-59 (stating that the monitoring of an asset by a secured creditor may act to 
effectively monitor the debtor as a whole).  For critiques on Levmore’s theory, see Buckley, 
supra note 4, at 1442-45 (suggesting its empirical weakness in addition to the theoretical 
difficulties); Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle, supra note 3, at 1056-59 (discussing its 
theoretical inconsistency). 
 38.  See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 4, at 1143 (stating that security acts as 
protection against claims from competing creditors); see also Triantis, Secured Debt, supra 
note 4, at 244-45 (incorporating Levmore’s theory of asset-specific monitoring).  The 
monitoring efficiency argument for secured debts, however, does not bear out empirically.  
See Buckley, supra note 4, at 1441-44 (suggesting that optimal efficiency would require 
either the largest creditors or the creditors most capable of monitoring be unsecured, which 
contradicts reality where banks are typically secured creditors); Schwartz, Security Interests, 
supra note 3, at 11-14 (stating that because short-term debt requires less monitoring, one 
would expect to see unsecured short-term debt, yet the large amount of secured short-term 
debt by retailers contradicts this).  In this paper, I do not attempt to assess the validity of the 
monitoring cost justification for security interests, as my focus on cases with the existence 
of nonadjusting creditors contradicts the very assumption underlying this justification: 
unsecured creditors adjusting interest rates to reflect their increased monitoring costs in the 
wake of the issuance of secured debts. 
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misbehaviors rises as a result.  The reduced monitoring can, as Professors 
Bebchuk and Fried have noted, take the form of reduced use of financial 
covenants and reduced effort in enforcing the covenants that do appear in 
secured loan agreements.39  An important function of loan covenants is to 
simplify monitoring by creditors in that a breach of covenants may signal 
potential debtor misbehaviors that can be hard to observe otherwise.  Thus, 
enforcing these covenants as agreed is a primary approach to control the 
debtor’s opportunistic actions after debt issuance.40  Fully secured creditors 
are insufficiently incentivized to incorporate rigorous covenants in their 
loan agreements, and perhaps more importantly, to diligently enforce the 
ones that do get incorporated since the priority they enjoy perfectly shields 
them from the negative effects of the elevated probability of debtor 
misbehaviors. 
3. Lowered Precaution Against Tort Liabilities 
The third category of inefficiency accompanying the distributional 
effect of security interests under the current priority scheme is that the 
borrower is likely to take less precaution against the potential tort liabilities 
resulting from its operation.  Though not inherently a form of agency costs 
of debt financing, insufficient precaution against harm to third parties 
nevertheless represents a loss to society. 
When the debt is unsecured, the creditor will charge the debtor a 
higher interest rate to the extent that it anticipates future tort claims will 
dilute the creditor’s share in the borrower’s bankruptcy estate, thus 
lowering the value of its loan.  Through this mechanism, the creditor forces 
the debtor to internalize more of the costs of potential accidents if the latter 
fails to take sufficient precautions.  A secured debt with full priority, 
 
 39.  Professors Bebchuk and Fried seem to agree that reduced use and enforcement of 
loan covenants reflect secured creditors’ dampened enthusiasm to monitor the debtor, 
because the authors discussed these two issues in the same subsection in their 1997.  
Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1315-18; see also Bebchuk & Fried, 
Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 897-98, 900-902 (also discussing the lack of interest in 
using and enforcing covenants in the same subsection of the article, titled “Efficiency Costs 
of Full Priority”). 
 40.  Some covenants specifically require information such as financial statements and 
accounting techniques from the debtor, thus facilitating the detection of misbehaviors.  
Others forbid certain activities that may link to debtor misbehaviors, such as borrowing new 
debts or paying dividends, so the breach of these covenants may signal potential 
misbehaviors.  For a detailed analysis of the economic functions of financial covenants, see 
Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond 
Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).  For an explanation of the legal issues involved in 
drafting and using financial covenants, see Robert M. Lloyd, Financial Covenants in 
Commercial Loan Documentation: Uses and Limitations, 58 TENN. L. REV. 335 (1991). 
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however, safeguards the creditor against the dilution of tort claims, thereby 
eliminating the need to raise the interest rate.  Consequently, it is easier for 
the debtor to externalize the costs of potential harm to tort victims, and its 
incentive to take precautions diminishes.41  What follows will be an 
increase in value of unsafe firms, which in turn results in an inefficient 
allocation of capital to these firms and a greater number of accidents.42 
With all these inefficiencies, the priority status held by secured 
creditors in bankruptcy indeed becomes an uneasy award unless there are 
enough counteracting benefits.  The remainder of this Article explores 
these benefits. 
II. A REVIEW OF THE THEORIES ON THE EFFICIENCY OF SECURED 
LENDING 
Explorations for its efficiency benefits have long been at the center of 
scholarly research on security lending.  However, the uneasy case 
presented by Professors Bebchuk and Fried specifically targets the priority 
of secured claims with nonadjusting creditors on the scene.  To make the 
case less “uneasy,”, efficiency benefits of secured lending must: (i) stem 
from the priority effect, and (ii) exist even in the presence of nonadjusting 
creditors.  As discussed below, most efficiency arguments for secured 
lending are either misleading or do not meet these two criteria.43 
A. Signaling Efficiency 
Arguments for the efficiency of secured lending can be divided 
roughly into two groups – those based on its function of mitigating 
information asymmetry and those emphasizing its role in tackling with 
agency problems.44  Whereas the focus of this paper, as well as that of 
 
 41.  Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1319; Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy 
Case 1, supra note 5, at 898-900.  For the more general discussion of suboptimal investment 
as a result of limited liability, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, at 1909-16 (1991). 
 42.  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1417-18. 
 43.  This Part does not address the efficiency of secured lending in overcoming 
underinvestment; this seems to be the consensus, as even Professors Bebchuk and Fried did 
not dispute it.  Alleviating the uneasiness of the priority enjoyed by secured creditors, 
therefore, requires the identification of some other benefits.  But the underinvestment 
problems will be discussed later in this paper, which argues that even this merit of secured 
lending is actually subject to the “paradox of security lending.”  See Part VI A infra. 
 44.  To be more accurate, the former group focuses on the “information asymmetry 
related to parameters of payoff distributions as they exist at the time the debt is issued,” 
while the latter focuses on the difficulty in controlling debtor misbehaviors after the debt is 
issued but before its maturity.  Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 233. 
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Professor Bebchuk and Fried’s, is on the latter,45 I will briefly assess the 
signaling efficiency justification presented by the former group.46 
The signaling efficiency theory assumes that the lenders have 
imperfect information about the risk of the debtor’s projects, but are aware 
of the possibility that firms with low-quality projects will borrow at interest 
rates not reflecting the risk of these projects if the interest rates are set 
based on relatively high-quality projects.  So lenders will, when lacking 
information about the quality of particular projects, suppose the average 
project quality to be low and charge higher interest rates accordingly.  
Firms with projects of higher quality than the market average, hoping for 
better interest rates, will have an incentive to signal to the market their 
relative status.47 
A security interest serves as a credible signal if the borrower’s cost of 
awarding it varies inversely with the quality of its investment, making 
firms with low-quality projects less inclined to send the same signal.  The 
proponents of this theory submit that it is indeed the case.48 
Four attributes of secured debts are thought to be relevant in this 
respect.  First, a security interest in a specific asset reduces the future 
alienability of the asset by the debtor because, as a general rule, the transfer 
of collateral passes title to the transferee subject to the perfected security 
interest unless the transfer is made in the ordinary course of business.  As a 
result, the debtor, after issuance of secured debts, constrains its ability to 
capitalize on riskier investment opportunities by substituting the collateral.  
All else being equal, this constraint is more costly for firms with riskier and 
less profitable investments. 
Second, if the collateral is a piece of a firm-specific asset with 
substantial idiosyncratic value to the debtor, loss of such value resulting 
 
 45.  The limited empirical study on the efficiency of secured lending finds little support 
for the information-asymmetry theory.  See Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., 
The Priority Structure of Corporate Liabilities, 50 J. FIN. 899, 909 (1995) (using firms’ 
abnormal future earnings to measure empirically the value of signaling models in explaining 
priority structure, and concluding that they have little value in explaining the information-
asymmetry hypothesis). 
 46.  Professor Buckley proposed another theory regarding information asymmetry: the 
screening efficiency of secured debts.  See Buckley, supra note 4, at 1421-26 (reasoning that 
the grant of security interests reduces lenders’ net screening costs).  Interesting as it is, the 
specific mechanism underlying the screening efficiency is not necessarily clear.  See Part 
VI.B, infra for a short discussion. 
 47.  Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 14-15 (discussing secured debt as a 
signal of project quality). 
 48.  The description in the following paragraphs is based on Triantis, Secured Debt, 
supra note 4, at 247, 253-55 (discussing secured debt and its use as a constraint on wealth 
distribution and as a signal).  See also Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 15 
(discussing the theory of signaling and its consequences). 
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from the enforcement of security interest amounts to a significant threat to 
the debtor.  The greater the probability of default, the larger the expected 
cost of losing the idiosyncratic value.  Therefore, low-quality debtors 
would be less willing to grant security interests in firm-specific assets. 
Third, in the event of default, the repossessory right held by secured 
creditors usually enables them to quickly seize the collateral.  Since the 
equity value of a financially distressed firm depends on the probability of 
recovery, which wanes with the shortened time span of debt enforcement 
by secured creditors, the issuance of secured debts becomes more 
expensive for lower-quality borrowers, all else being equal. 
Finally, given their ability to seize collateral and thereby impede the 
debtor’s operations, secured creditors can sometimes exert substantial 
influence on the debtor’s business decisions.  The cost of the expected 
interference, however, is believed to vary inversely with firm quality. 
Professor Schwartz criticizes the signaling theory for its lack of 
exactness, stability, and the possibility of dissipative signaling.49  But even 
if the arguments made by its advocates are sufficiently persuasive, the 
effectiveness of signaling seems to depend on, as Professors Bebchuk and 
Fried call it, the priority-independent benefits of secured debt, so the 
signaling efficiency theory does not meet the first criterion set above.  
Professor Adler asserts that a security interest is both a property interest 
and a priority interest.50  To that end, it appears that the presumed signaling 
function of a security interest derives primarily from its characteristics as a 
property interest.  The curtailed alienability is obviously a consequence of 
the in rem nature of property interests.51  The repossessory right is also 
likely to find its kinship from property interests, such as the right of 
eviction traditionally held by landlords.52  To the extent that the secured 
 
 49.  See Alan Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2073, 
2084-85 (1994) (discussing asymmetric information and signaling); Schwartz, Security 
Interests, supra note 3, at 17-21 (explaining why the signaling theory has serious 
difficulties); see also Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 
244-47 (1989) (criticizing the faults of the signaling theory, such as failing to address the 
problem of mimicking, which refers to the ability of “bad” debtors to “mimic” the quality of 
“good” debtors by offering comparable security interests). 
 50.  Barry E. Adler, Secured Credit Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 405, 405 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Adler, Secured 
Credit] (stating that a security interest is a priority interest that allows secured loans to be 
repaid head of other obligations, and also a property interest attached to the collateral). 
 51.  For the in rem nature of property interests, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360-66 
(2001) (discussing the traditional conception of property rights). 
 52.  See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.80 
(3d ed. 2000) (discussing eviction by self-help).  Admittedly, this kind of self-help right 
substantially diminished even with respect to property interests.  However, the key point 
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creditor’s leverage comes from this repossessory right, it might as well be 
understood as a byproduct of the proprietary effects of security interests.53  
 
here is that the signaling effect of a security interest, if any, does not rely on its priority. 
 53.  Professor Listokin suggests that the effectiveness of foreclosure as a deterrence to 
debtor misbehaviors depends critically on the priority of security.  But for the priority 
enjoyed by secured creditors in bankruptcy, the foreclosure threat would not be credible 
when the debtor counter threatens to file for bankruptcy.  See Listokin, supra note 2, at 1050 
n.39 (noting that secured creditors will be reluctant to foreclose when the secured creditor 
does not enjoy priority but that secured creditors who do enjoy priority would not be so 
loath to do so).   
First of all, Listokin’s reasoning apparently assumes that the debtor’s counterthreat 
is credible, which, given the costs of bankruptcy on the debtor, may not be true.  But even if 
we are ready to accept this assumption, his position is not convincing as the priority of 
security interests, if it does anything, probably undermines, rather than advances, the 
credibility of the foreclosure threat.  It is crucial to note that the credibility of this threat 
depends on whether the secured creditor’s expected payoff when it carries out the threat is 
greater than its expected payoff when it does not, given, respectively, the existence or 
nonexistence of priority.  Even in a world without priority, the secured creditor’s threat is 
credible as long as it expects to be better off by carrying out its threat, and the same 
condition holds for the threat to be credible in a world with priority.  It does not matter, 
however, whether the secured creditor would recover more should it enjoy the priority.  
Judging by this standard, it seems that a secured creditor entitled to priority will, at most, be 
indifferent as to whether to carry out its threat and trigger the bankruptcy filing immediately 
because in either case it will be fully repaid insofar as it is not undersecured.  Indeed, 
considering the imperfect protections provided to secured claims under the bankruptcy law, 
the secured creditor may even be worse-off by trapping itself into the bankruptcy process 
(for the imperfections of bankruptcy protection of secured claims, see Schwarcz, supra note 
4, at 456-57 (pointing to the automatic stay, the risk that collateral may be substituted, and 
the fact that an oversecured lender is not always entitled to the full value of the collateral 
cushion).  On the other hand, without priority, a secured creditor will still proceed to 
foreclose if the resulting immediate bankruptcy is expected to provide better financial 
recovery than what it would otherwise receive through later debt collection.  Interestingly, 
when the secured creditor, in this context, believes that the debtor attempts to misbehave, 
perhaps it is bound to take action immediately since debtor misbehaviors by definition will 
reduce the amount of assets available to creditors, from which the secured creditor without 
priority will be repaid proportionately.  The secured creditor can hardly expect more value if 
it tolerates the misbehavior.  Foreclosure thus seems to be a dominant strategy for the 
secured creditor without priority.  Absent the shield of priority, the secured creditor is 
exposed to the danger of debtor’s wealth-redistributing actions much like unsecured 
creditors.  Therefore, the secured creditor should be more serious at wielding any power it 
has to deter the debtor’s opportunism in a world where priority does not exist.   
This, however, leads us to a more fundamental question about why a fully secured 
creditor entitled to priority will ever want to control debtor misbehaviors as far as these 
misbehaviors do not impair the value of collateral.  If secured creditors with priority even 
“do not in fact appear to do much actual monitoring of collateral value,” then it is unrealistic 
to anticipate them to use whatever leverage they may have to prevent the debtor from 
misbehaving.  See Buckley supra note 4, at 1443.  After all, they will be repaid from the 
collateral value regardless of the debtor’s behaviors.  I will further discuss this issue below, 
in connection with the monitoring efficiency and leverage efficiency arguments for security 
interests.  See Part III.B & C infra. 
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As for the loss of idiosyncratic value, it is clear that priority does not 
matter, either.  This kind of loss occurs whenever the collateral is sold, but 
has nothing to do with how the sale proceeds are divided among the 
creditors. 
B. Monitoring Efficiency 
The monitoring efficiency argument, as well as the leverage and the 
overinvestment prevention arguments discussed below, focus on the 
potential of secured lending to lessen the agency costs of debt financing.  
Effectively, they all stress the advantage of using secured lending to 
constrain debtor misbehaviors at a lower cost. 
The presumed monitoring efficiency of secured debts comes from the 
differing incentives to monitor the borrower of secured versus unsecured 
creditors.  One line of reasoning, sometimes referred to as the “relative 
skills theory,”54 starts by noting that secured lenders are less incentivized to 
monitor the debtor since they are free from the risk of loss insofar as the 
value of their collateral exceeds the value of their loan.  On the other hand, 
when advised of the existence of secured credits, unsecured lenders will 
increase their monitoring efforts as they are now subject to even higher risk 
of loss in the event that the debtor misbehaves.  In light of such an 
incentive difference, the borrower will be better off if it issues security 
interests in a way that reduces the overall agency costs in a competitive 
debt market.  This can be achieved by granting security interests to lenders 
with relatively higher monitoring costs to muffle their willingness to 
monitor, thus channeling the monitoring responsibility to those more 
skilled monitors.55 
Another version of the monitoring theory emphasizes the possibly 
disparate nature of asset-specific monitoring vis-à-vis general monitoring.  
It insists that secured creditors are encouraged to conduct asset-specific 
monitoring of debtor misbehaviors concerning the collateral, while 
unsecured creditors will be led to policing other agency problems.  When 
different creditors have comparative advantages in different kinds of 
monitoring, security interests enable the parties to exploit economies of 
scale and specialization of labor by efficient allocation of monitoring tasks 
among creditors.56  Therefore, this version of monitoring efficiency 
 
 54.  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1441. 
 55.  See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 4, at 1159-60 (discussing the connections 
between secured lending and monitoring costs); see also Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 
4, at 245 (describing how an optimal collective-monitoring strategy by restructuring the 
financial incentives for monitoring). 
 56.  See Levmore, supra note 4, at 55-57 (discussing secured lending as a solution to 
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argument is called the “specialization theory.”57 
The logic underpinning the relative skills theory seems sound.  As the 
lower-cost monitor undertakes more intensive monitoring (saving the 
efforts of the higher-cost monitor), the total monitoring costs decline.  
However, the resulting degree of monitoring is still not optimal, given the 
externalities associated with monitoring in multiple-creditor cases.  The 
critics’ major attack against this theory lies in its failure to bear out 
empirically.  For instance, banks are more frequently secured than trade 
creditors, notwithstanding the fact that the latter category is unlikely to be a 
more sophisticated monitor than the former.58  Similarly, suppliers to 
complex businesses are not secured any more frequently than suppliers to 
simple businesses in spite of the relative convenience for the latter to 
monitor.59  It is worth noting that secured lending might be a rather 
primitive device for allocating monitoring responsibilities among creditors 
with varying skills in policing debtor misbehaviors.  Indeed, it works 
almost like an on-and-off switch to signal when the secured creditor has an 
adequate equity cushion in the collateral.60 
The specialization theory, on the other hand, relies on the dubious 
validity of more restrictive assumptions.  One necessary condition for such 
specialized monitoring appears to say that a creditor will be more 
motivated to monitor particular assets when those assets are used to secure 
that creditor’s loan.  But the opposite situation may be equally, if not more, 
plausible.  The property nature of security interests dulls the creditor’s 
interest in monitoring because the secured creditor’s rights in a particular 
piece of collateral are not compromised, regardless of whether the debtor 
engages in asset substitution or asset removal.  In addition, when a creditor 
does have a comparative advantage in monitoring certain kinds of assets, it 
should be no less motivated to monitor these assets as an unsecured 
creditor than as a secured one, and its monitoring is likely to be part of the 
equilibrium outcome of a non-cooperative game. 
As Professor Schwartz has noted, only one monitor can exist in a 
stable equilibrium, regardless of whether a secured debt is used, when one 
creditor’s monitoring is sufficient to prevent debtor misbehaviors related to 
particular assets.61  Since there is a creditor assumed to be better at such 
 
the freeriding problem); see also Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 244-45 (discussing 
the effect of a security agreement on monitoring costs).  
 57.  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1442. 
 58.  Id. at 1441-42. 
 59.  Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 11 n.28. 
 60.  In theory, the parties can leave the secured creditor’s loan only partly secured, and 
adjust the ratio of the secured and unsecured portions to fine-tune the creditors’ monitoring 
incentive but in practice, the cost of doing so may well outweigh its benefit.  
 61.  See Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle, supra note 3, at 1055-58 (examining Levmore’s 
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monitoring, the equilibrium that elicits its monitoring is probably the focal 
point of the game.  Therefore, monitoring, if it ever occurs, will plausibly 
be conducted by that creditor.  In other words, specialized monitoring is 
always possible, whether the debt is secured or not. 
Even if monitoring efficiency does exist, under either the relative 
skills theory or the specialization theory, when all creditors make 
adjustments as a result of the issuance of secured debts, this efficiency will 
not arise in the presence of nonadjusting creditors.  One creditor’s 
monitoring would lower the probability of debtor misbehavior, which is a 
benefit shared by all creditors of the same debtor, but the costs of 
monitoring are borne solely by the creditor that monitors.  Because of the 
free rider problem, creditor monitoring is suboptimal in general.  As 
security dampens the secured creditor’s monitoring incentive further, 
secured lending will exacerbate the under-monitoring problem if unsecured 
creditors do not strengthen their monitoring accordingly.  This implies that, 
with the presence of nonadjusting creditors, secured debts will not improve 
the overall monitoring efficiency except when it is the nonadjusting 
creditors that are secured, which appears unlikely without compulsory legal 
intervention.62  Therefore, monitoring efficiency cannot pass the second 
criteria mentioned above (a benefit existing even without the presence of 
nonadjusting creditors) for a less uneasy case of secured credit. 
C. Leverage Efficiency 
A third argument for the efficiency of secured lending looks at the 
leverage held by secured creditors to restrict potential debtor misbehaviors.  
According to Professor Scott, “the primary value of collateral is . . . the 
strong negotiating position that it gives to the secured creditor,”63 and “the 
function of secured credit is conceived within the industry as enabling the 
creditor to influence debtor actions prior to the onset of business failure.”64  
This presumed effect of security on curbing debtor misbehaviors, however, 
relies on at least two integrated conditions: (i) secured lending increases the 
creditor’s leverage and (ii) the secured creditor is properly motivated to use 
its leverage. 
Does secured lending increase the creditor’s leverage over the debtor’s 
discretion in investment strategy?  The advocates of the leverage theory 
 
theory that two creditors monitoring a debtor’s assets creates added costs for the debtor, and 
thus the debtor will secure a single efficient monitor to minimize credit costs). 
 62.  If nonadjusting creditors were secured, the distributional effect of security would 
not be an issue in the first place. 
 63.  Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 4, at 945. 
 64.  Id. at 950. 
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believe that “the main foundation of the secured creditor’s leverage is the 
differential between the collateral’s value to the borrower and the amount 
that the lender would credit on the loan if the collateral were liquidated 
under the security agreement or mortgage.”65  In other words, the secured 
creditor’s ability to liquidate the debtor’s assets at a value lower than what 
they are worth to the debtor imposes constraints on the debtor’s 
opportunism that may trigger such liquidation.  But is this ability unique to 
secured creditors?  Are unsecured creditors able and willing to do so as 
well?66  A creditor tends to sell assets at prices less than their value to the 
debtor for two reasons when doing so is cost-justifiable. 
First, these assets generate value specific to the debtor so that no other 
market participants can enjoy such value.  Second, although the assets can 
be sold at a higher price, doing so does not give the creditor any additional 
benefit surpassing the cost.  The first reason seems applicable to secured 
and unsecured creditors alike.  If we believe that the assets are sold at lower 
prices for the second reason, however, secured creditors may have different 
incentives than unsecured creditors to pursue this kind of sale.  When the 
debtor is insolvent,67 an adequately secured creditor will not realize any 
gain by selling the collateral at a higher price than what is necessary to 
recover its loan, while an unsecured creditor will benefit, according to its 
share in the total unsecured bankruptcy claims, from any incremental 
increase in the sale price of the debtor’s assets.68  Therefore, other things 
being equal, a fully secured creditor is more likely to liquidate the debtor’s 
assets at low prices, if it does conduct such liquidation at all. 
In addition, relying on its right to foreclose, a secured creditor can 
make the liquidation less costly.  In particular, Professor Scott emphasizes 
that the foreclosure right precludes the necessity of verifying the debtor’s 
inefficient investment decision to the court, which can be extremely hard.69  
 
 65.  Mann, supra note 4, at 665. 
 66.  Professor Buckley suspects that secured creditor’s leverage is not substantially 
different from an unsecured creditor. Buckley, supra note 4, at 1445-46. 
 67.  If the debtor is not insolvent, secured and unsecured creditors should have similar 
incentives to liquidate the debtor’s assets to recover debts because, in this situation, all 
creditors, whether secured or not, are supposed to get fully repaid. 
 68.  If the collateral is insufficient to pay off a secured creditor’s bankruptcy claims, the 
creditor will have a strong incentive to push up the price of collateral to recover its loan and 
to act like an unsecured creditor in tackling the debtor’s other assets. 
 69.  Robert E. Scott, The Truth about Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436, 
1451 (1997).  It should be noted, however, that the secured creditor’s right to repossess and 
foreclose after default is not unlimited.  As the most important limit on this right, self-help 
repossession will be denied for breach of the peace (U.C.C. §9-609), in which case the 
secured creditor will not be allowed to bypass the formal court procedures.  For a detailed 
discussion of the “breach of the peace” limit, see LoPucki & Warren, supra note 1, at 47-52.  
Moreover, Professor Buckley suspects that secured creditors do not have an unequivocal 
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All these seem to suggest that a security interest does give a creditor some 
unique leverage over the debtor. 
But the additional leverage possessed by secured creditors does not 
necessarily imply that they will be motivated to use such leverage.  As 
noted above, secured creditors become less eager to monitor debtor 
misbehaviors, which inevitably means that they are less prone to deter 
these misbehaviors, whatever leverage they may have.  Fully secured 
creditors can comfortably rely on the equity cushion, and even when 
inadequately secured, the creditors’ incentive to monitor will shrink to the 
extent they are secured, in that additional monitoring will not have as much 
benefit as if they were completely unsecured.70 
Professor Scott did record some evidence that secured creditors 
routinely monitor the debtor’s business affairs.71  What needs to be proved, 
however, is that the same creditors would not have engaged in monitoring 
more, or at least equally, diligently were they unsecured.  Otherwise, as 
Professor Buckley correctly noted, any cost savings associated with the 
additional leverage held by secured creditors “would probably be offset by 
the inefficiencies that arise when a major lender has a reduced incentive to 
monitor.”72  For this counterfactual, however, the advocates of the leverage 
theory have not provided any disproof.73 
 
advantage in enforcing their loans as unsecured lenders may also bargain for the right to 
send in a receiver on default.  See Buckley, supra note 4, at 1446. 
 70.  Suppose that the amount of a certain lender’s loan is L, of which 1-a% is secured (0 
< a < 100), and that the amount of the borrower’s other unsecured debt is C.  Then every 
unit of monitoring will increase this lender’s loan recovery by a%L/(a%L+C) of the increase 
in the debtor’s asset value resulting from this last unit of monitoring.  But if the creditor 
were unsecured, all else being equal, every additional unit of monitoring would make it 
better off by L/(L+C) of the increase in the debtor’s asset value due to such monitoring.  
Obviously, extra monitoring can bring the creditor more benefit when it is unsecured for 
L/(L+C) > a%L/(a%L+C).  In other words, the marginal benefit of monitoring is higher 
when a creditor is unsecured.  Assuming, quite plausibly, that the creditor’s marginal cost of 
monitoring does not vary with the acquisition of security, we should expect a creditor’s 
monitoring efforts to drop when it is secured. 
 71.  Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 4, at 947. 
 72.  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1446. 
 73.  Professor Mann presented a dramatic example in which the secured creditor 
significantly misunderstood the enforceability of the collateral to underline the necessity for 
secured creditors to monitor.  See Mann, supra note 4, at 640 n.55 (discussing the example 
of a Dutch bank that loaned money to a fur company and was subsequently prevented by 
animal rights activists from recovering its loan through the slaughter of beavers pledged as 
collateral).  But such a problem stemming from the nature of the debtor’s assets should 
perplex unsecured creditors as much as secured creditors.  In other words, given the special 
nature of these assets, a creditor might well be better incentivized to monitor when it is 
unsecured than secured.  Mann suggests another reason why secured lenders would be 
“imprudent to rely predominantly on their ability to obtain forcible repayment through 
liquidation of the collateral is that they are generally unable to recover the indirect costs that 
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In any event, even if we believe that without the presence of 
nonadjusting creditors, secured lenders will really exert their influence to 
restrict debtor misbehaviors, so that the aggregate amount of agency costs 
goes down, the leverage theory fails to explain why rational secured 
creditors will still be interested in constraining debtor misbehaviors, rather 
than making profits on these misbehaviors, when nonadjusting creditors do 
appear.74  For example, a creditor will happily finance the $500 cost of a 
project with a 10% chance of yielding $3,000 and a 90% chance of yielding 
$0 by taking a security interest on the debtor’s $800 safe assets if the 
debtor, subject to a tort liability of $1,000, agrees to share the gains from 
this inefficient investment with the creditor.  Consequently, the leverage 
theory is unlikely to establish the efficiency of secured lending in the 
presence of nonadjusting creditors. 
D. Controlling Overinvestment 
The last important argument for the efficiency of secured lending 
centers on the overinvestment problem.  Three mechanisms have been 
suggested to control either the debtor’s ability or its incentive to overinvest. 
1. Disabling Asset Substitution 
As security interests run with the collateral when it is transferred 
without the secured lender’s permission, the pledged assets become less 
prone to asset substitution.  Also, secured creditors’ repossessory right 
allows for timely and less costly action to default.  These features of 
security interests are considered to constrain the borrower’s ability to 
overinvest through asset substitution.75  But this perceived function of 
secured debt apparently has nothing to do with its priority status.76 
 
they incur when monitoring a problem loan.”  Id.  But this fits squarely as a reason for 
curtailed, rather than enhanced, monitoring incentives held by secured creditors. 
 74.  Given the existence of nonadjusting creditors, expecting a secured creditor to use 
its leverage and control debtor misbehaviors essentially counts on a free riding structure to 
boost efficiency.  As Professor Buckley noted more than two decades ago, the question of 
“who monitors the monitor” will loom up in any arrangement based on free riding.  See 
Buckley, supra note 4, at 1442-43. 
 75.  Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal 
Capital Structure: Comment, 34 J. FIN. 247, 250 (1979). 
 76.  See supra notes 50-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text 
(explaining the relation with priority status). 
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2. Precluding Subsequent Borrowing to Finance Risky Projects 
Granting security interests to earlier lenders, it is argued, can limit the 
debtor’s ability to finance subsequent overinvestment based on the belief 
that the later lender will only agree to advance credit at an interest rate so 
high as to render the risky project unattractive to the debtor.77  In other 
words, the previously issued secured debt forces subsequent creditors to 
take into account the risk of inefficient projects and to adjust the cost of 
capital appropriately. 
This efficiency rationale for secured lending, however, seems less 
convincing if the earlier lender is well informed and has full flexibility to 
adjust its interest rate.  No matter whether it lends secured at a lower 
interest rate or unsecured at a higher interest rate, the cost of 
overinvestment will always fall on the debtor, given that the subsequent 
lender is also an adjusting creditor.  Therefore, this second mechanism of 
overinvestment control inevitably rests on the relaxation of one assumption 
initially made by Professor Schwartz to introduce the “puzzle of secured 
debt” so that the earlier creditors cannot “calculate risks of default 
reasonably precisely.”78  In other words, they must be nonadjusting 
creditors.  But if these lenders were unable to adjust their interest rates, the 
rational debtor would be induced to borrow unsecured to externalize the 
cost of overinvestment, unless it was impossible to do so in the debtor’s 
early life.  In other words, this second mechanism will become irrelevant if 
the debtor can borrow unsecured loans from adjusting creditors, and it will 
be inconsistent with the debtor’s borrowing incentive if unsecured loans 
can be obtained from nonadjusting creditors. 
Consequently, such a use of secured debts to constrain overinvestment 
only works in a limited situation where the borrower cannot acquire 
unsecured financing from either adjusting or nonadjusting lenders.  In fact, 
some of its advocates do believe that the priority awarded to earlier lenders 
is necessary for loans made early in the debtor’s life.79  Yet if a security 
 
 77.  Adler, Secured Credit, supra note 50, at 406; see also George G. Triantis, A Free-
Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2155, 2163 
(1994) [hereinafter Triantis, Free-Cash-Flow] (illustrating a tradeoff between first-in-time 
and later-in-time priority rules). 
 78.  See supra note 14 (discussing four assumptions made by Professor Schwartz). 
 79.  See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 2113 n.25 and accompanying text 
(illustrating a problem in which the interest rate that will satisfy creditors must increase 
indefinitely as conservative debtors continue to drop out of the market in the face of rising 
interest rates).  Insisting that secured credit is a source of needed liquidity to debtors but not 
enumerating why such liquidity is impossible to be acquired through unsecured borrowing, 
Professor Steven Schwarcz might have at the back of his mind a similar concern of market 
collapse due to information asymmetry.  See Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 442 n.75 and 
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interest with bankruptcy priority is really a precondition for early loans 
from nonadjusting creditors, then should such priority be abolished, these 
lenders would not appear at all, and the inefficient externalization of 
overinvestment costs would not be an issue in the first place.80 
Moreover, the borrower will only issue secured debts early in their life 
if the market is filled with lenders unwilling to advance unsecured credits.  
Indeed, in such a market, without reasonable knowledge about the debtor’s 
expected lifespan, no creditor should ever extend unsecured loans.  In this 
situation, essentially, no creditor will be able to play the role of an effective 
controller of overinvestment since none can be sure whether it is in the 
position of a relatively “earlier” or “later” lender.  This logical prediction, 
however, is plainly at odds with the reality, as we do see unsecured 
lending, but not secured debts, crammed in borrowers’ early lives.81 
Even if this second mechanism does bridle overinvestment, as some 
have hoped, it requires the proper adjustment by later creditors.  
Consequently, its perceived efficiency effect will not materialize when 
security is granted to the earlier creditor.  Yet the subsequent creditors, 
such as employees or customers, are unable to negotiate interest rates to 
account for existing debt obligations.  Overinvestment follows and wealth 
is redistributed to the borrower, again, from the nonadjusting creditors.  
Apparently, the case for the priority of secured claims is not made any 
easier by this second theory of overinvestment-control when we take 
nonadjusting creditors into consideration. 
3. Reducing Incentives to Overinvest 
The last mechanism through which secured lending may be used to 
control overinvestment focuses on the debtor’s incentive, rather than 
ability, to take up risky yet less efficient projects.  It was mentioned by 
Professor Buckley in his study on bankruptcy priority, where he precisely 
noted that the debtor’s incentive to overinvest can rise with the increase in 
the cost of credit.82  As far as security interests help lower this cost, he 
believes that overinvestment should be less serious a problem in the context 
of secured lending.83 
 
accompanying text (noting that secured credit enhances debtors’ liquidity, which can keep 
troubled but viable debtors out of bankruptcy).  But interestingly, he believes that borrowers 
will reserve their assets for the issuance of secured debts to later, rather than earlier, 
lenders. 
 80.  This is known as the “underinvestment problem.” 
 81.  See Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 22 (criticizing this “staggering 
debt” theory of secured lending for empirical weakness). 
 82.  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1430. 
 83.  Id. at 1430, 1437-38.  My research finds no allusion to this mechanism by other 
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However, Professor Buckley seemingly misunderstood the exact 
reason why this could be a merit of secured lending.  I will explain it in 
detail in the next part of this Article, and show that this is indeed a unique 
efficiency advantage of offering priority to secured creditors that sustains 
the presence of nonadjusting creditors.  Suffice it to say here that the 
borrower’s incentive to overinvest hinges on its entire cost of borrowing, 
instead of the isolated cost of secured debts.  Therefore, in the world of 
fully informed creditors, such as that envisioned by Professor Buckley,84 
secured lending will not actually depress the borrower’s avidity for 
overinvestment. 
By limiting his emphasis narrowly on the cost of secured debts alone, 
Professor Buckley failed to take into consideration the change in the cost of 
unsecured debts, which will cancel out the supposed incentive effect 
brought about by the creation of security interests.  He also misinterpreted 
secured lending as a response to the preference of fully informed earlier 
lenders.85  When creditors are truly informed, as Professor Buckley himself 
indicated, the costs imposed by the debtor’s adverse incentives will be 
borne by the debtor itself.86  So creditors should be indifferent, whether 
secured or not.  Then, it must be the debtor’s call to take advantage of the 
reduction in cost of credit, if any, as a consequence of issuing secured 
debts. 
E. Summary 
The literature review above indicates that the existing theories on the 
efficiency of secured lending are insufficient to explain the bankruptcy 
priority accompanying secured claims.  Some of them do not entail a 
requirement for priority (e.g., signaling, asset substitution).  Others fail to 
withstand the presence of nonadjusting creditors (e.g., monitoring, 
leverage, draining subsequent borrowing), even if they could be persuasive 
 
law scholars, although a similar idea was introduced in the economics literature.  See, e.g., 
Helmut Bester, The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, 31 
EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 887, 895-97 (1987) (demonstrating Stiglitz and Weiss’s conclusion 
that credit contracts can create incentive effects for entrepreneurs who are faced with a 
choice between various investment schemes, and that this choice antecedes a moral hazard 
that may result in rationing or other losses in welfare). 
 84.  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1426 (discussing secured lending as a means of 
counterbalancing the shortcomings in incentives faced by companies which can otherwise 
be ameliorated by fully informing investors). 
 85.  See id. at 1437-38 (arguing that principal lenders will opt into security to protect 
themselves against the “risk of debt alteration”). 
 86.  See id. at 1426 (“[A]dverse incentives impose costs that will be borne by the firm 
itself so long as investors have full information.”). 
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otherwise.  The only promising candidate left, the incentive effect on 
overinvestment, seems incomplete and somewhat misleading in its current 
version, and may have exaggerated the potential efficiency of secured 
lending.  I turn now to this final point. 
III. THE PARADOXES OF SECURED LENDING 
As reviewed in the previous Part, no existing theory has managed to 
adequately explain the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy when some 
creditors do not adjust interest rates to reflect the increased risk associated 
with their loans after issuance of secured debts.  However, one effect of 
secured lending is missing, somewhat surprisingly, in most legal writings 
on the topic:  To the extent that secured lending lowers the cost of capital, 
it can disincentivize the borrower to engage in overinvestment.87  This 
effect does count in favor of the priority of secured debts, for the 
borrower’s cost of credit can be reduced only if secured lenders enjoy more 
favorable status in bankruptcy proceedings.88  It also sustains the presence 
of nonadjusting creditors, who will not alter the interest charges for their 
credits while secured creditors are cutting down theirs.  As a result, the 
borrower’s total burden of debt declines. 
This rarely explored virtue of secured lending exhibits two paradoxes, 
however.  For one thing, the efficiency of secured debts seems so entangled 
with its distributional impacts that any attempt to rein in the latter can only 
be done at the sacrifice of the former.  For another, while secured debts 
remove the borrower’s motivation to overinvest under certain 
circumstances, they also inspire the borrower to invest excessively under 
others. 
To focus on the incentive effects resulting from the varying cost of 
credit, I put aside in this Part other costs involved in using secured debts.  
So the cost of issuing secured debts, the possibility of creditor’s 
monitoring, as well as the borrower’s ability to take precaution against tort 
damages, are all ignored for the moment.89 
 
 87.  As noted, Professor Buckley is the one exception who noticed this efficiency effect 
of secured lending, though with obvious flaws.  See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying 
text. 
 88.  This is not to deny that the in rem nature of security and the right of foreclosure 
may also help bring down the interest rates charged by secured creditors.  But without a 
priority in bankruptcy, the decrease in interest rates of secured loans is probably negligible.  
It is the bankruptcy priority feature that directly addresses the risk of lending, which 
determines the risk premium: a major component of loan interests. 
 89.  These costs will be considered in Part V., infra. 
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A. The Primary Paradox: Efficiency Residing in Distribution 
Overinvesting incentives dwindle as the cost of capital drops.  Yet 
secured lending can achieve this only if the unsecured creditors do not raise 
their interest rates.  In other words, the overinvestment problem can be 
eased only if two conditions are met simultaneously:  Secured creditors 
enjoy priority in bankruptcy and unsecured creditors are nonadjusting. 
1. Decrease in Interest Rates 
When debtors invest in risky projects that ultimately succeed, they 
keep the return from such investment, after paying back the principal and 
interests of loans.  But under the limited liability regime, debtors only bear 
the costs of investment to the extent of the value of their assets in case of 
an investment failure, and any remaining cost will be shifted to their 
creditors.  In effect, debtors are essentially gambling with other peoples’ 
money.  Rational debtors, of course, would want to keep the expected 
repayment obligation to their creditors as low as possible while deriving as 
much returns from their investments as they can.  Since the debtor’s return 
on investment is determined by the expected value of the investment 
project and the expected amount of debt repayment, it needs to strike a 
balance between the two sides when making investment decisions.  As 
between two investment options, one with a higher probability of failure 
and less socially valuable than the other, the riskier one benefits the debtor 
by scaling down its expected repayment to the creditor because the 
probability of success shrinks alongside the probability of making full 
repayment. 
At the same time however, this riskier option also has lower expected 
value than the relatively safer project.  As the interest rate rises, the 
debtor’s expected saving from the riskier investment project grows in view 
of the lower probability of making full repayment enabled by this kind of 
project.90  This renders the safer option increasingly unappealing to the 
debtor.  Therefore, the higher the interest rate charged for the loan, the 
more incentivized the borrower will be to invest in risky but inefficient 
projects, other things being equal. 
 
 90.  Put differently, the borrower’s expected repayment obligation grows as the 
committed amount of interest rises, while the riskiness of investment keeps constant.  In this 
sense, the borrower can be viewed as internalizing a lower portion of the value of 
investment with the increase in interest rate.  Professor Buckley presents this view in a 
similar way: “As the cost of credit rises, a greater portion of firm value is assigned to 
creditors, and the firm’s temptation to gamble with other people’s money increases 
accordingly.”  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1430. 
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Some notations can be used to further clarify the idea.  Consider a 
risk-neutral firm with an initial wealth of W.  It is choosing between two 
investment projects, requiring the same amount of cost, C, which will be 
financed by borrowing from a fully adjusting and risk-neutral creditor at 
the interest of RCi, where the subscript i indicates the project actually 
chosen by the firm.  RCi varies depending on whether the loan is secured, so 
it can be written as RCi(S), where S = 1 if C is secured, and S = 0 if not.91 
Project 1 yields a return of x1 when it succeeds with a probability of p1, 
while Project 2 brings in x2 in case of success, which has a probability of 
p2.  When they fail, neither project generates any return.  Suppose Project 1 
is more efficient and less risky; in other words, p1x1 > p2x2 and p1 > p2.  
Consequently, the creditor will ask for higher, or at least the same,92 rate of 
interest if it knows Project 2 is to be picked, all else being equal (i.e. RC1 ≤ 
RC2).93  Also assume the firm’s other creditors hold total debt of N bearing a 
fixed amount of interest, RN.  The firm has enough wealth, W, to fully 
secure C,94 but in case of investment failure, it will not be able to repay its 
entire debts95 (i.e. C ≤ W < C + N). 
Under these setups, the firm’s expected payoff from investing in 
Project 1 is: 
 
p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W). (1) 
 
However, since even the adjusting creditor cannot know which project 
is eventually undertaken after the loan is advanced, the firm will be ready 
to pick this less risky project only if: 
 
 
 91.  Although the firm can choose to secure any proportion of C in principle, it should 
secure the loan as fully as possible, in that the interest rate of C decreases with the increase 
in the collateral used to secure the loan and the firm’s payoff rises with the decrease in 
interest rate, given that the firm’s total debt (N) and interest thereon (RN) are fixed. 
 92.  When the loan is fully secured, risk of investment failure will not matter in 
determining the amount of interest. 
 93.  Without loss of generality, suppose the rate of return for riskless loans is zero.  
Then, the interest charged for a risky loan can be written as R = (1-p)(C-T)/p where p is the 
probability of success, C is the amount of the loan, and T is the amount recoverable in case 
of failure.  Obviously, R increases as p decreases. 
 94.  Relaxing this assumption will not change the conclusions of this Article.  Indeed, 
these conclusions will be valid if an adjusting creditor charges a lower interest rate when her 
credit is secured.  For any C that exceeds W, we can think of the adjusting creditor as 
partially secured to the extent of W, with an unsecured credit of c = C – W.  It can be proved 
that the interest rate charged by an adjusting creditor increases in the amount of her 
unsecured credit.  See infra note 99 and accompanying text.  Since C > c, it follows that a 
partially secured adjusting creditor still charges a lower interest rate than a fully unsecured 
creditor. 
 95.  Otherwise the loan is riskless, which renders the security unnecessary. 
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p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) > p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W). 
 
Otherwise, it will be better off by promising to invest in Project 1 but 
actually investing in the riskier Project 2.  In economists’ jargon, it is not 
incentive compatible for the firm to choose Project 1 when the interest of 
the loan is RC1 and: 
 
(2) p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) ≤ p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W). 
 
As long as (2) is satisfied, we will see the firm invest in the inefficient 
Project 2.  Since an adjusting creditor is informed of the parameters of 
these projects and understands the borrower’s investment strategy, the 
creditor will charge RC2 as the interest of the loan, assuming that the riskier 
investment still makes the firm better off than the status quo.96  The firm 
might fare better if it could commit itself credibly to Project 1 and pay a 
lower interest of RC1.  But since it is unable to do so,97 the only choice left 
is to take the loan with a higher interest and undertake the riskier project.98  
This welfare loss results exactly from the agency cost of debt financing 
when costless monitoring is impossible.  After rearrangement, the condition 
under which the inefficient overinvestment emerges can be written as: 
 
(3) p1x1-p2x2 ≤ (p1-p2)(C+RC1+N+RN-W). 
 
The left-hand side of (3) shows the firm’s cost of opting for a riskier 
project, the decrease in the expected value of investment projects, which is 
its highest possible amount of gains expected from the investment.  The 
right-hand side of (3) is the expected benefit from the riskier project, i.e. 
the decrease in its expected repayment to the creditors.  As the benefit 
exceeds the cost, the firm will go after the investment project with higher 
risk and lower expected value.  The inequality of (3) shows that the firm’s 
benefit from overinvesting in Project 2 expands as its promised repayment, 
C+RC1+N+RN, increases, other things being equal. 
 
 96.  To be specific, I assume W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W].  This assumption 
will be relaxed in Part B.  In addition, note that under the regime of limited liability, both 
W-N-RN and pi[xi-C-RCi-N-RN+W] should be nonnegative. 
 97.  Note that the adjusting creditor cannot control, without cost, the borrower’s 
investment decisions made between the time of debt issuance and the time of its maturity.  
As monitoring is not to be considered in this section, adjusting interest rates becomes the 
only way to deal with the risk of lending. 
 98.  It is not incentive-compatible for the firm to choose Project 1 when RC2 is charged 
and (2) is satisfied.  Given (2), we have p1x1 - p2x2 - (p1-p2)(C+N+RN-W) ≤ (p1-p2)RC1.  At 
the same time, since RC1 ≤ RC2, p1x1 - p2x2 - (p1-p2)(C+N+RN-W) ≤ (p1-p2)RC2, this means 
that p1(x1-C-RC2-N-RN+W) ≤ p2(x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W). 
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Since p1 > p2, we can divide both sides of (3) by p1-p2, and get: 
 
(4) (p1x1-p2x2)/(p1-p2) ≤ C+RC1+N+RN-W. 
 
Let us define the left-hand side of the inequality (4) as D.  The value 
of D varies with the specific characteristics of the potential projects 
denoted by p’s and x’s.  Regardless of the exact values of p’s and x’s, the 
condition for the firm to prefer the riskier project represented by (4) will be 
easier to satisfy as the value of the right-hand side increases.  Since C, N, 
RN, and W are all fixed by assumptions, the firm’s incentive to overinvest 
strengthens as RC1, the amount of interest charged by the lender to finance 
the less risky project, increases.99 
As already noted, secured lending contributes to reducing loan 
interests, in that the priority granted to secured lenders in bankruptcy 
attenuates the risk of their loans.  Adding a few more assumptions to the 
previous model can readily prove this.  Assume that the riskless rate of 
return is zero.  Then a fully secured lender enjoying unimpaired priority 
will charge zero interest.  But if it is unsecured and subject to a pro rata 
distribution in bankruptcy, the lender will charge a positive rate of interest.  
Using the notations, we can write RC1(1) = 0, and RC1(0) = C(1-p1)[1-
W/(C+N)]/p1.100  Therefore, secured lending induces the firm to invest in 
Project 2 if: 
 
D ≤ C+N+RN-W, (5) 
 
whereas unsecured lending drives it to choose this riskier project if: 
 
D ≤ C+C(1-p1)[1-W/(C+N)]/p1+N+RN-W. (6). 
 
Compared with secured lending, unsecured lending tends to inflate the 
 
 99.  Suppose p’s and x’s are all random variables.  Then D itself is a random variable.  
If we write out its cumulative distribution function as F(d), then the probability for the firm 
to opt for the riskier and inefficient Project 2 is F(C+RC+N+RN-W), which rises with the 
value of the right-hand side of (4).  Fundamentally, this is a simplified demonstration of a 
more general proposition.  As first suggested by Jensen and Meckling’s seminal paper on 
the agency costs of debt financing, as the promised debt payment increases, the debtor 
increases monotonically the risk of its investment strategy.  See Jensen & Meckling, supra 
note 32 (demonstrating that the agency cost of debt increases as the amount of outside 
financing increases); see also Green & Talmor, supra note 32 (providing a more general 
proof of this proposition). 
 100.  Solve p1[C+RC1(0)] + (1-p1)[W*C/(C+N)] = C.  For simplicity, I assume that the 
interest of either credit, C or N, has not accrued when the investment fails and the firm files 
bankruptcy.  Thus, neither is included in calculating the bankruptcy claims.  See 11 U.S.C. § 
502(b)(2) (2012) (listing the exceptions to the allowance of bankruptcy claims or interests). 
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likelihood that the inefficient Project 2 is selected, since C(1-p1)[1-
W/(C+N)]/p1 will be nonnegative given p1 < 1 and W < C + N. 
2. Presence of Nonadjusting Creditors 
As inequalities (3) and (4) show, the debtor’s benefit from carrying 
out the riskier project depends on the entire amount of repayment to all 
creditors, both secured and unsecured.  The debtor’s incentive to overinvest 
cannot be reduced if the unsecured creditors raise their interest rates to 
compensate for the heightened risk owing to the issuance of secured debts.  
When unsecured creditors are fully adjusting, the debtor’s savings in 
interest payments on secured loans will be cancelled out by the additional 
charges made to account for the extra risk of unsecured credits.  As a result, 
the total cost of credit remains unchanged.  In brief, the efficiency of 
secured lending in discouraging overinvestment will occur only if at least 
some unsecured creditors do not peg their interest rates to the debtor’s use 
of secured debts.101 
The analysis thus far has shown the following two interlinked points.  
First, secured lending, with its priority in bankruptcy, can promote 
efficiency by moderating the borrower’s incentive to overinvest.  Second, 
this efficiency effect relies precisely on the existence of nonadjusting 
creditors.  In other words, the efficiency of secured lending goes hand-in-
hand with its distributional effects.  Fundamentally, these two countering 
facets of the welfare impact lead to the primary paradox of secured lending. 
The intuition behind this paradox is easy to understand.  Indeed, it is 
foreshadowed by “the puzzle of secured debt.”  Secured lending should 
generate no social benefit insofar as risk-neutral creditors have 
 
 101.  This can be observed if the previous model is extended by allowing the interest of 
N, RNi, to change based on whether the finance for investment is obtained as a secured loan.  
If the loan is fully secured, as stated above, RCi(1) is zero, and RNi(1) can be solved from 
pi(N+RNi) + (1-pi)(W-C) = N, which is (1-pi)(C+N-W)/pi.  So the necessary condition for the 
firm to opt for Project 2, when secured lending is used, is D ≤ C + N + RC1(1) + RN1(1) – W 
= C + N + 0 + (1-p1)(C+N-W)/p1 – W.   
On the other hand, if an unsecured loan is used to finance the investment project, 
both creditors will be subject to pro-rata distributions once the borrower goes bankrupt.  
Hence, RCi(0) is the solution to pi(C+RCi) + (1-pi)[W*C/(C+N)] = C, and similarly, RNi(0) 
can be calculated by solving pi(N+RNi) + (1-pi)[W*N/(C+N)] = N, which is N(1-pi)[1-
W/(C+N)]/pi.   
Accordingly, in the case of unsecured lending, the necessary condition for the firm 
to choose the riskier project becomes D ≤ C + N + RC1(0) + RN1(0) – W, and the right-hand 
side of this inequality turns out to be C + N + (1-p1)(C+N-W)/p1 – W, too.  In short, as far as 
all creditors are adjusting, the total cost of credit converges no matter whether the loan used 
to finance the investment is secured or not, and therefore the firm will choose the same 
investment project.  
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homogenous expectations about default probability, can assess the risks of 
default reasonably accurately, and can adjust interest rates based on this 
assessment.102  Hence, any efficiency in secured lending must be a 
consequence of a deviation from the prototypical creditor.  Without 
lingering over the empirically controversial features of this prototype, risk-
neutrality, and homogenous expectations, then creditors’ weaknesses in 
evaluating default risk and accounting for it in interest rates inevitably 
emerges as a possible source of inefficiency that can be remedied by 
secured lending. 
Surprisingly, most legal scholars have never mentioned the advantage 
of security interests in restraining the borrower’s incentive, rather than 
ability, to invest in an excessively risky way.  For those who have 
mentioned it, the paradoxical nature of this incentive’s effect was plainly 
neglected.103  This oversight might have resulted in an exaggeration of the 
efficiency of secured lending.  The primary paradox shows that—to borrow 
two terms from Professor Buckley—the “soft defenses of secured lending” 
have difficulty coexisting with the “hard defenses of secured lending,”104 at 
least in terms of control over the borrower’s adverse incentives.105  As 
Buckley notes, “soft defenses” offer no affirmative justification for secured 
lending; instead, they prove only that the practice lacks distributional 
effects.106  “Hard defenses,” in contrast, positively assert that secured 
lending promotes efficiency goals.107  Soft defenses, then, inevitably 
undermine the merit of secured lending as they constrain overinvestment, 
focusing instead on the lack of distributional effects.  The insignificant loss 
suffered by nonadjusting creditors necessarily implies a minor incentive 
efficiency that stems from the issuance of secured debts. 
Moreover, it is a particularly forceful strike against his hard defenses 
when Professor Buckley suggested superpriority rights as a remedy for 
distributional disadvantage suffered by tort creditors.108  Allowing these 
truly nonadjusting creditors to prevail over all other creditors in bankruptcy 
 
 102.  See Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3. 
 103.  Professor Buckley neglected this issue in his discussion about the influence of 
security interests on borrowers’ adverse incentives.  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1426-39.  It 
seems that financial economists largely ignore the importance of non-adjusting creditors in 
discouraging overinvestment as well.  See, e.g., Bester, supra note 83. 
 104.  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1402-04.  Soft defenses aim at qualifying the 
distributional impacts of secured lending, while the hard defenses aim at illuminating its 
efficiency benefits.  See id., supra note 4, at 1404-39 (comparing between soft defenses and 
hard defenses). 
 105.  The primary paradox may also exist in the context of screening efficiency, which is 
another one of Professor Buckley’s hard defenses of secured lending.  See Part VI.B. infra.  
 106.  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1404. 
 107.  Id. at 1403-04 
 108.  Id. at 1406. 
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would raise secured lenders’ interest charges, without any corresponding 
decrease in the amount of bankruptcy claims held by the tort claimants.  
The borrower’s total cost of credit, therefore, is bound to grow, which, as 
Professor Buckley himself admitted, will spark even more 
overinvestment.109  Although the proposal is made to strengthen his soft 
defenses, it effectively defeats his own commendation for secured lending 
as a constraint on overinvestment when super-secured tort creditors dwarf 
secured lenders.  This contradiction in viewpoints is attributable once again 
to the lack of awareness of this Article’s proposed primary paradox 
associated with secured lending. 
B. Secondary Paradox: Exacerbating and Alleviating Overinvestment 
Ironically, secured lending not only alleviates the overinvestment 
problem, but, at times, can also exacerbate it.  This ostensible contradiction 
rests on the fact that the lower cost of credit allows the borrower both to 
better internalize the value of investment and to have easier access to 
credit.  This latter effect feeds the borrower’s appetite for inefficient 
investments that could not be financed without the option of secured 
lending.110  The legal literature treats these conflicting effects of secured 
lending separately.  While some writers blame it for encouraging inefficient 
investments, a few others praise it for curbing borrowers’ adverse 
incentives.111  Amazingly, however, no effort has been made to link them 
coherently and present a less partial view of secured financing. 
Let’s continue with the model set up in A.1 of Part IV.  Up to this 
point, I have assumed that the firm, when it borrows on an unsecured basis, 
can still reap a positive net gain even if it chooses the riskier, yet less 
efficient, investment project and pays a higher interest, or: 
 
W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W].112 
 
So, be it secured or not, the firm will borrow from the adjusting creditor in 
any event.  But once we relax this assumption, it becomes clear that 
sometimes the firm will not borrow at all if a secured loan is not available, 
because the interest rate will be too high to justify any investment.  When it 
is socially inefficient to invest in certain potential projects, i.e. projects 
 
 109.  Id. at 1430. 
 110.  See, e.g., Triantis, Free-Cash-Flow, supra note 77, at 2163 (explaining secured 
debt and creditor priorities). 
 111.  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1430. 
 112.  See supra note 96 (noting that the assumption W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W] 
would be relaxed in this section). 
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with expected values lower than their costs, secured lending nonetheless 
facilitates the financing of such undesirable investments. 
We can write out the complete conditions for the firm to undertake the 
two projects illustrated in A.1.  It picks Project 1 only if: 
 
(7) p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) > p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W), and 
(8) W-N-RN < p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W). 
 
The firm chooses Project 2 when: 
 
(2) p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) ≤ p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W), and 
(9) W-N-RN < p2(x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W). 
 
Finally, the firm will choose not to borrow at all if: 
 
(7) p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) > p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W), and 
(10) W-N-RN ≥ p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W)113;  
 
or if : 
(2) p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) ≤ p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W), and 
(11) W-N-RN ≥ p2(x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W);  
 
or if : 
(10) W-N-RN ≥ p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W), and 
(11) W-N-RN ≥ p2(x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W). 
 
In A.1 of this Part, I demonstrated that secured lending disincentivizes 
overinvestment when the firm can gain from investing in risky projects 
even if it has to pay the higher amount of interest, RC2(0).  Now I will 
explore the opposite case.  When it does not pay to invest in Project 2 with 
an unsecured loan, i.e. W-N-RN ≥ p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W], three scenarios 
need to be considered: (a) it does not pay to invest either in Project 1 with 
an unsecured loan or W-N-RN ≥ p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W]; Ib) it pays to 
invest in Project 1 with an unsecured loan, but the firm cannot credibly 
commit to undertaking this investment if the interest is set at RC1(0); i.e., 
when W-N-RN < p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] and p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] ≤ 
p2[x2-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W]; and (c) it pays to invest in Project 1 with an 
 
 113.  When the inequalities (7) and (10) are satisfied, it must be true that p2(x2-C-RC2-N-
RN+W) < W-N-RN (Given (7), p1x1-p2x2 – (p1-p2)(C+N+RN-W) – (p1-p2)RC1 > 0; since (p1-
p2)RC1 – (p1RC1-p2RC2) = p2(RC2-RC1) ≥ 0, p1x1-p2x2 – (p1-p2)(C+N+RN-W) – (p1RC1-p2RC2) > 
0, i.e. p2(x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W) < p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W)).  Therefore, the firm is not willing to 
invest in Project 2, either. 
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unsecured loan, and the firm can credibly commit itself to this investment if 
the interest is set at RC1(0); i.e., W–N–RN < p1[x1–C–RC1(0)–N–RN+W] and 
p1[x1–C–RC1(0)–N–RN+W] > p2[x2–C–RC1(0)–N–RN+W].  The firm will not 
want to borrow and invest in scenarios a) and b) if secured borrowing is 
impossible114; in scenario (c), it will invest in Project 1.115 
In the event that neither project is socially efficient; i.e., p2x2 < p1x1 < 
C, investment in either of them is undesirable.  In scenario (a), secured 
lending lowers the interest charged by the adjusting creditor, so it raises the 
probabilities that (7), (8), and (9) will be satisfied, which means the firm 
becomes more likely to undertake one of these investments.  Similarly, in 
scenario (b), secured lending makes (7) and (9) easier to satisfy, so that the 
firm will also become more enthusiastic about investing in one of those two 
projects.  In scenario (c), secured lending increases the likelihood of (9) 
being satisfied, but this will not influence the firm’s investment decision.  
As a whole, therefore, secured lending tends to encourage overinvestment 
when the firm is presented with only inefficient investment opportunities, 
and is not willing to borrow unsecured loans to finance the riskier project. 
We see that secured lending can exacerbate the overinvestment 
problem in another case after we abandon the assumption W-N-RN < p2[x2-
C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W].  When only the less risky Project 1 is socially 
efficient; i.e., p1x1 > C > p2x2, we hope to undertake Project 1, not Project 2.  
Yet secured lending seems to be an awkward tool to achieve this goal.  In 
both scenarios (a) and (b), secured lending, by reducing the amount of 
interests, enhances the probability of inequality (9) being satisfied.  
Nevertheless, the reduction in interests may not be so significant as to meet 
the condition (7).  Consequently, sometimes we will have a case where 
inequalities (2) and (9) are satisfied after a secured debt is used; hence the 
inefficient Project 2, rather than Project 1, is undertaken.116  In general, as 
shown by the inequality (4), secured lending tends to distort investment 
incentives by encouraging overinvestment.  This is true when the borrower 
encounters an investment opportunity set in which the ratio of the 
difference in expected values to the difference in success probabilities is 
too low to attract the borrower to the efficient project, and the lower 
interest charged by a secured lender makes the inefficient project appealing 
 
 114.  Inequalities (10) and (11) are satisfied in scenario (a), and inequalities (2) and (11) 
are satisfied in scenario (b). 
 115.  Inequalities (7) and (8) are satisfied in scenario (c). 
 116.  In both scenarios (a) and (b), the decrease in interest may also cause the concurrent 
satisfaction of inequalities (7) and (8) so that the desirable outcome emerges.  These are the 
cases where secured lending helps overcome the underinvestment problem, which will be 
discussed later in this Article.  Moreover, secured lending might render conditions (2) and 
(8) satisfied in scenario (a), and condition (9) met in situation (c); however, neither will lead 
to different investment decisions. 
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to the same borrower. 
To complete our analysis, let’s look at the case in which both 
investment projects generate net gains to the society: 
 
 (C < p2x2 < p1x1), yet W–N–RN ≥ p2[x2–C–RC2–N–RN+W].  
 
Clearly, allowing for secured lending here will not give rise to any concern 
for overinvestment.  If the more efficient project 1 is picked even when the 
loan is unsecured, using secured debts should not alter the borrower’s 
decision.  If neither project will be undertaken without a secured loan, then 
the lower interest charged by a secured lender raises the probability that 
one of these efficient projects will be undertaken.117 
The numeric illustrations below demonstrate the two aforementioned 
circumstances in which secured lending may exacerbate the overinvestment 
problem. 
 
Example 1.  Firm is a risk-neutral debtor.  The value of Firm’s own 
assets, which can be used as collateral, is $1,000, and this value does not 
change with the outcome of prospective investments.  Suppose the interest 
rate for a risk-free loan is zero.  At t0, Firm issues a debt of $1,000, secured 
or unsecured, to a risk-neural adjusting Creditor 2 in order to finance the 
investment in one of the following two projects.  Project 1 has an upside of 
$1,800, and its probability of success is 50%.  The upside of Project 2 is 
$8,400, and its probability of success is 10%.  If failed, both projects yield 
nothing.  Firm makes a choice between these two projects at t1, after the 
debt is issued.  The outcomes of these projects become clear at t2. 
In addition, another Firm’s creditor, Creditor 1, has an outstanding 
unsecured credit of $500 and is completely ignorant of the riskiness of its 
credit, so it charges zero interest regardless of Firm’s investment and 
financing strategies.  Firm’s obligations to both creditors mature at t2, and it 
will go bankrupt if the total amount of debt obligations exceeds its asset 
value.118  Finally, to focus on the overinvestment incentive caused by 
secured lending, assume awarding security interests is costless. 
Obviously, neither Project 1 nor Project 2 is worth pursing from the 
social perspective.  Nevertheless, Firm will choose to invest in Project 2 if 
it can obtain a secured loan from Creditor 2.  When secured, Creditor 2 will 
ask for zero interest since its loan is riskless under this circumstance.  Then, 
 
 117.  In this case, secured lending can enhance social welfare by alleviating the 
underinvestment problem.  See Part VI.A. infra (clarifying the usage of the term 
“underinvestment” as herein stated). 
 118.  To simplify calculation, I assume again that the loan interest should not be included 
in Creditor 2’s bankruptcy claim. 
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Firm’s net gain from Project 1 will be 50%(1,800–1,000–500+1,000) – 
(1,000–500) = $150, but its gain will be even greater if it invests in Project 
2, which amounts to 10%(8,400–1,000–500+1,000) – (1,000–500) = $290. 
When unsecured, on the contrary, Creditor 2 will expect to receive a 
pro rata distribution in the event of Firm’s bankruptcy.  This forces it to 
adjust the interest rates to reflect the riskiness of the loan.  If Firm invests 
in Project 1, Creditor 2 should charge an interest of $333, the solution to 
the equation 50%(1,000+r) + 50%*1,000*1,000/(500+1,000) = 1,000 
where r stands for the amount of interest.  However, if the interest is indeed 
set at $333, Firm will be better off by investing in Project 2 since 
10%(8,400–1,000–500–333+1,000) – (1,000–500) = $256.7, greater than 
50%(1,800–1,000–500–333+1,000) – (1,000–500) = -$16.5.  Knowing this, 
Creditor 2 will be willing to lend unsecured only if the amount of interest is 
$3,000, the solution to 10%(1,000+r) + 90%*1,000*1,000/(500+1,000) = 
1,000.  But then Firm will not want to invest at all, because neither project 
will generate a positive gain compared to the status quo.119  Therefore, the 
inefficient investment can be avoided if secured lending is not permitted. 
 
Example 2.  Suppose the upside of Project 1 rises to $2,050 and all 
other settings are the same as the previous example.  Now Project 1 is 
socially efficient since its expected value is greater than its cost.  But 
secured lending will still prompt Firm to invest in the inefficient Project 2 
since, given the probabilities of success, the expected value of Project 1 is 
not high enough to appeal to the borrower.120  When a secured debt is used 
and Creditor 2 charges zero interest, Firm’s net gain from the two projects 
can be calculated, respectively, as 50%(2,050–1,000–500+1,000) – (1,000–
500) = $275 and 10%(8,400–1,000–500+1,000) – (1,000–500) = $290.  
From Firm’s point of view, Project 2 is preferable to Project 1, 
notwithstanding the fact that the society will suffer a net loss of $160 from 
the former. 
As in Example 1, Firm will refrain from investing if secured lending is 
not an option.  An unsecured Creditor 2 will again ask for an interest of 
$3,000,121 leaving Firm a net loss with either investment project.  
Consequently, in this case, secured lending triggers an incentive to 
overinvest as well.122 
 
 119.  Firm’s net gain from Project 2 will be 10%(8,400–1,000–500–3,000+1,000) – 500 
= -$10, and its net gain from Project 1 even lower. 
 120.  In this example, Project 1 will be more attractive than its alternative if its expected 
value is greater than $1,040 or its upside is greater than $2,080. 
 121.  Note that the probability of failure is the same as in Example 1, so the amount of 
interest will not change, either.  Again, setting the interest at $333, Creditor 2 will see Firm 
opt for Project 2. 
 122.  It is worth noting, though, that disallowing the use of secured debts triggers an 
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So far, I have depicted the secondary paradox of secured lending:  It 
will both discourage and encourage overinvestment when the law allows 
the borrower to grant security interests at will.  This paradox is secondary 
in the sense that it is a consequence of the fact that the distributional effect 
is a necessary condition for the adverse-incentive-undermining efficiency 
of secured lending, the thrust of the primary paradox.  In terms of its effect 
on overinvestment, the two opposite momentums of secured lending both 
arise from its distributional impact.  We have seen that W–N-RN ≥ p2[x2–C-
RC2(0)–N–RN+W] is a necessary condition for secured debts to encourage 
overinvestment, and that this condition is more likely to be met as p2x2 
decreases.123  Therefore, all other things being equal, secured lending will 
be increasingly undesirable, in terms of its effect on the borrower’s 
overinvesting incentive, as the expected value of the riskier investment 
project decreases. 
This secondary paradox implies that mechanisms to insulate 
nonadjusting creditors from distributional effects might constrain 
overinvestment in some situations, especially when the borrower only has 
investment opportunities with relatively low returns.  Yet in other 
situations, these mechanisms can strengthen overinvesting incentives since 
the borrower’s overall cost of capital rises as nonadjusting creditors are 
protected from cost externalization.  Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal of 
“partial priority” is one of the distribution-preventing mechanisms.124  With 
the demotion of secured creditors in the rank of bankruptcy distribution, the 
vice of security is dispelled, but so is its virtue.  Another frequently 
suggested mechanism would confer superpriority on tort creditors.125  By 
the same token, however, it is expected to alleviate overinvestment in some 
circumstances while exacerbate the problem in others.126  There also seems 
 
unexplored opportunity of investment in a positive NPV project; i.e., the problem of 
underinvestment, which will be discussed later. 
 123.  As x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W ≥ 0 due to limited liability, p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W) 
drops with both p2 and x2. 
 124.  See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 904-13 (describing two 
types of partial priority systems: an “adjustable priority rule” and “fixed-fraction priority 
rule”); see also Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1323-37 (discussing the 
effects of implementing partial priority). 
 125.  See the literature cited in supra note 7 for details of this suggestion. 
 126.  To illustrate, consider the following variant of Example 1.  Let the upsides of 
Project 1 and Project 2 increase respectively to $3,000 and $12,000, all other conditions 
being the same.  When Creditor 1 is entitled to superpriority, Firm will not bother to create a 
security interest for Creditor 2, so the latter will charge an interest of $4,500 (note that a 
$500 interest cannot induce Firm to stick to Project 1).  At this interest rate, Firm is 
incentivized to pick the less-efficient Project 2.  On the contrary, if Creditor 1 is not 
protected by superpriority, Firm can grant Creditor 2 a security interest, in which case 
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to be a widespread belief that awarding priority to prior creditors restricts 
overinvestment by the borrower.127  Nevertheless, if the prior creditor is 
nonadjusting, the first-in-time priority will carry the same paradoxical 
effects on overinvestment.  Therefore, perhaps it is premature to 
recommend the “internalizing” legal mechanisms before we have a clearer 
idea about the magnitudes of their contradictory impacts. 
IV. MAJOR COSTS OF THE PARADOXICAL SECURED LENDING 
REVISITED 
The paradoxes presented above remind us of the uncomfortable fact 
that secured lending is a double-edged sword:  It may benefit our society as 
a whole, but only at the expense of some of its members; it improves our 
well-being at some points in time, but causes damages at others.  This is 
true even if the secured creditors, with priority in bankruptcy, influence 
only the borrowers’ investment strategies.  However, their impact is 
certainly beyond that.  Section C. of Part II summarized the consequences 
when secured lending distributes welfare among the relevant parties.  In 
this section, I will illustrate two of these consequences: reduced monitoring 
efforts and distorted precaution incentives.  For the latter, I will utilize 
numerical examples to illustrate the factors deserving our attention, as we 
balance the costs and benefits of security. 
A. Reduced Monitoring Efforts 
Overinvestment can be contained either through modifying debtors’ 
incentives or through monitoring their behaviors.  As discussed previously, 
while secured debts may sometimes suppress debtors’ adverse incentives, 
they also tend to weaken lenders’ motivation to monitor.  In the presence of 
nonadjusting creditors, the reduced monitoring efforts of secured parties 
enhance the debtor’s chance to invest in an excessively risky manner.  
When the available investment opportunities compel the borrower to 
undertake the efficient project only if secured borrowing scales down its 
total cost of capital, issuance of secured debts improves the overall social 
 
Creditor 2’s interest charge drops to zero, and the more efficient Project 1 will be 
undertaken. 
 127.  E.g. Adler, Secured Credit, supra note 50, at 406 (explaining that if early creditors 
have priority, subsequent creditors will protect themselves by charging higher interest rates, 
which will increase the cost for the debtor); Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 2113 
(stating that “a first-in-time priority system is a more practical means of solving the risk 
alteration problem”); Triantis, Free-Cash-Flow, supra note 77, at 2163 (stating that granting 
priority to first-in-time creditors prevents debtors from obtaining credit for subsequent risky 
gambles). 
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welfare by saving monitoring costs and any residual cost of overinvestment 
due to incomplete monitoring (assuming the costs of secured borrowing 
themselves are not too high). 
In contrast, when secured lending is unable to align private and social 
interests given a certain investment opportunity set, unsecured debts may 
bring about additional monitoring to reduce the likelihood of 
overinvestment, or they may simply cut off the costs associated with the 
issuance of secured debts.  These points can be seen from the following 
examples. 
 
Example 3.  Firm is a risk-neutral debtor.  The value of Firm’s own 
asset, which can be used as collateral, is $1,000.  This value does not 
change with the outcome of prospective investments.  Suppose that the 
interest rate for a risk-free loan is zero.  At t0, Firm issues a debt of $1,000, 
secured or unsecured, to a risk-neutral adjusting Creditor 2 in order to 
finance the investment in one of the following two projects.  Project 1 has 
an upside of $3,000, and its probability of success is 50%.  The upside of 
Project 2 is $12,000, and its probability of success is 10%.  Both projects 
yield nothing if they fail.  At t1, after the debt is issued, Firm makes a choice 
between these two projects.  The outcomes of these projects become clear 
at t2.  In addition, Firm’s other creditor, Creditor 1, has an outstanding 
unsecured credit of $500 and is completely ignorant of the riskiness of its 
credit, so it charges zero interest regardless of Firm’s investment and 
financing strategies.  Firm’s obligations to both creditors mature at t2, and it 
will go bankrupt if the total amount of debt obligations exceeds its asset 
value.128  Let us also assume that Creditor 2’s monitoring effort can lower 
Firm’s chance to invest in the riskier Project 2 by 50% at a cost of $50.  
Finally, the cost involved in issuing a secured debt is $20. 
When Creditor 2’s lending is secured, its loan is subject to essentially 
no risk, so the creditor is not likely to be enthusiastic about monitoring the 
debtor.129  In this case, Firm will choose Project 1 since its net gain from 
this option is 50%(3,000–1,000–500+1,000) – (1,000–500) – 20 = $730, 
greater than the net gain from Project 2, which equals 10%(12,000–1,000–
500+1,000) – (1,000–500) – 20 = $630.  Accordingly, the gain of the 
society, net of the cost, is 50%*3,000 – 1,000 – 20 = $480. 
 
 128.  As in the previous examples, the interest of the loan is assumed not to be included 
in Creditor 2’s bankruptcy claim. 
 129.  In fact, it is Firm who does not want monitoring as the cost of monitoring will be 
borne eventually by Firm, yet no benefit (i.e., any reduction in the amount of loan interest) 
can be reaped from monitoring since the monitor’s loan is riskless whether it monitors or 
not.  See supra Part III.B. for a discussion of the monitoring efficiency argument in favor of 
secured debt. 
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On the other hand, if its loan is unsecured, Creditor 2 will receive a 
pro rata distribution when Firm is bankrupt.  So its prospect of recovering 
the debt depends on Firm’s investment strategy, and Creditor 2 will take 
into account the cost of lending by adjusting the interest charge for the 
loan.  If Creditor 2 does not monitor and Firm is hence free to engage in 
Project 2, the amount of interest, rn, can be calculated by solving the 
equation 10%(1,000+rn) + 90%*1,000*1,000/(500+1,000) = 1,000, i.e. 
$3,000.130  Therefore, Firm’s net gain without monitoring is 10%(12,000–
1,500–3,000+1,000) – 500 = $350.  In contrast, if monitoring occurs, the 
interest of the loan, ry, will be $944, the solution to 50%[10%(1,000+ry) + 
90%*1,000*1,000/(500+1,000)]  + 50%[50%(1,000 + ry) + 
50%*1,000*1,000/(500+1,000)] = 1,000 + 50.131  Firm’s net gain now rises 
to 50%*10%(12,000–1,500–944+1,000) + 50%*50%(3,000–1,500–
944+1,000) – 500 = $416.8.  In other words, when a secured debt with full 
priority is not allowed, Firm will require monitoring and invest in either 
project with an equal chance.  As a result, the net social payoff is 
50%*50%*3,000 + 50%*10%*12,000 – 1,000 – 50 = $300.  Obviously, 
our social welfare increases when secured lending is allowed.  So this 
example presents a case where the balance between overinvestment control 
and monitoring inspiration tilts in favor of the employment of security 
interests. 
 
Example 4.  Assume the upside of riskier Project 2 turns to $13,200, 
while all other conditions remain the same as Example 3.  In this case, Firm 
will choose Project 2 if secured lending is allowed, since it will be better 
off by 10%(13,200–1,500+1,000) – 500 – 20 = $750, rather than $730, the 
net gain from investing in Project 1.  Accordingly, the net social payoff 
becomes 10%*13,200 – 1,000 – 20 = $300. 
If Creditor 2 cannot obtain priority in bankruptcy via secured lending, 
however, Firm will require monitoring by Creditor 2 so that there is only a 
50% chance that it invests in Project 2.  This can be seen from the 
following calculation.  Since Creditor 2’s risk of lending stays unchanged, 
monitoring or not, it will continue to charge rn=$3,000 when it does not 
monitor, and ry=$944 when it does.  Under this interest schedule, Firm will 
invest in Project 2 without monitoring; hence, its net gain is 10%(13,200–
 
 130.  rn cannot be the solution to 50%(1,000+rn) + 50%*1,000*1,000/(500+1,000) = 
1,000, i.e., $333, since a rational Firm would not pick Project 1 when the amount of interest 
is $333.  Firm’s net gains from Project 1 and Project 2, respectively, can be calculated as 
50%(3,000–1,500–333+1,000) – 500 = $583.5 and 10%(12,000–1,500–333+1,000) – 500 = 
$616.7. 
 131.  It can be verified that when the interest charged is $944, Firm is still better off by 
investing in Project 2 since 50%(3,000–1,500–944+1,000) – 500 = $278 < 10%(12,000–
1,500–944+1,000) – 500 = $555.6. 
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1,500–3,000+1,000) – 500 = $470.  On the other hand, Firm will lose a 
50% chance to pick the riskier project if Creditor 2 monitors, but its net 
gain will rise to 50%*10%(13,200–1,500–944+ 1,000) + 50%*50%(3,000–
1,500–944+1,000) – 500 = $476.8. 
Therefore, we can force Firm to accept monitoring by removing the 
priority status held by secured lenders, and the social welfare will be 
enhanced consequently, for the net social gain becomes 50%*50%*3,000 + 
50%*10%*13,200 – 1,000 – 50 = $360, $60 higher than if security 
interests with full priority are permitted.  In this example, we are presented 
with a situation where the tradeoff between monitoring and overinvestment 
control leads to a case for abandoning the full priority of secured claims in 
bankruptcy. 
 
Example 5.  Assume the upside of the riskier Project 2 increases to 
$14,000 and that all other conditions remain the same as Example 3.  Now, 
Firm will invest in Project 2 regardless of whether the borrowing is secured 
or not.  If a secured loan is used, Project 2 yields a net private gain of 
10%(14,000–1,500+1,000) – 500 – 20 = $830, while Project 1 still yields 
$730.  On the other hand, if Creditor 2 is not secured, under the creditor’s 
surveillance, Firm can reap a net gain of 50%*10%(14,000–1,500–944 
+1,000) + 50%*50%(3,000–1,500–944+1,000) – 500 = $516.8 whereas 
Firm’s net gain will rise to 10%(14,000–1,500–3,000+1,000) – 500 = $550 
when it is free from monitoring.132 
In this case, we cannot effectively overcome the overinvestment 
problem regardless of whether the secured leading is allowed or not.  
Considering the cost of issuing secured debts, removing this choice from 
the borrower nevertheless improves efficiency. 
 
The above examples have demonstrated that when the costs of issuing 
secured debts and monitoring debtor misbehavior are kept constant, the 
relative efficiency of secured vis-à-vis unsecured lending depends on the 
investment opportunity sets that the debtor encounters.  Therefore, no easy 
comparison can be made unless we have some knowledge about the 
potential distribution of these opportunity sets.  On the other hand, for any 
given set of investment options, the costs of monitoring and awarding 
security interests will determine the efficiency calculus of secured and 
unsecured lending. 
To illustrate, suppose in Example 3 the cost of issuing a secured loan 
is not $20, but $250.  Secured lending then generates a net social gain of 
 
 132.  Note that the interest charged by Creditor 2 will still be $944 when it monitors and 
$3,000 when it does not, since the risk of the unsecured loan remains unchanged throughout 
these three examples. 
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50%*3,000 – 1,000 – 250 = $250, lower than what society would obtain 
should secured lending be prohibited.133  Second, suppose Creditor 2 is 
such an efficient monitor that, in Example 3, its monitoring, at a cost of $5, 
can reduce Firm’s chance of investing in Project 2 by 98%.  Accordingly, 
Creditor 2 will charge an interest of ry equal to $354 when it advances an 
unsecured loan and conducts monitoring.134  Confronted with such a low-
cost monitor, Firm will ask for monitoring voluntarily when secured 
lending is not an option135; hence, the net social gain climbs to 
98%*50%*3,000 + 2%*10%*12,000 – 1,000 – 5 = $489 from $480 when 
secured lending is allowed.  In short, society appears to be better off, in 
terms of aggregate welfare, in a world without full-priority security. 
B. Distorted Incentive to Take Precaution 
As explained in C.3 of Part II, it has been well understood that secured 
debts with full priority distort the borrower’s decisions to take precaution 
against potential tort damages.  Considering the advantage of suppressing 
overinvestment, however, the relative efficiency of secured versus 
unsecured lending again varies from case to case, depending on the 
investment opportunities available to the borrower.  The following two 
examples illustrate the variability in this comparison. 
 
Example 6.  Firm is a risk-neutral debtor.  The value of Firm’s own 
asset, which can be used as collateral, is $1,000, and this value does not 
change with the outcome of prospective investments.  Suppose the interest 
rate for a risk-free loan is zero.  At t0, Firm issues a debt of $1,000, secured 
or unsecured, to a risk-neutral adjusting Creditor 2 in order to finance the 
investment in one of the following two projects.  Project 1 has an upside of 
$4,000, and its probability of success is 50%.  The upside of Project 2 is 
$7,200, and its probability of success is 25%.  If failed, both projects yield 
nothing.  Firm makes a choice between these two projects at t1, after the 
debt is issued.  The outcomes of these projects become clear at t2.  
Moreover, Firm’s operation may cause a harm of $1,500 to another party, 
 
 133.  Note that Firm will still prefer granting a security interest and investing in Project 1 
when secured lending is allowed, even if the cost of issuing secured debt rises to $250 
because by doing so its net gain amounts to $500.  This figure is higher than the maximum 
amount of net private gain, $416.8, when it borrows an unsecured debt. 
 134.  98%[50%(1,000+ry) + 50%*1,000*1,000/(500+1,000)] + 2%[10%(1,000+ry) + 
90%*1,000*1,000/(500+1,000)] = 1,000 + 5 
 135.  This strategy brings Firm a net gain of 98%*50%(3,000–1,500–354+1,000) + 
2%*10%(12,000–1,500–354+1,000) – 500 = $573.83, whereas no monitoring and 100% 
investment in Project 2 still brings it $350.  But secured lending enables Firm to realize an 
even higher net gain of $730. 
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Creditor 1, which occurs sometime between t0 and t2 with a 50% chance, 
but Firm can incur $500 to take precaution at t0 to avoid this harm.  The 
occurrence of the harm is independent from the success of Firm’s 
investment, and Firm will have to pay $1,500 in damages at t2 if it does 
occur.  Firm also needs to repay Creditor 2 at t2, and it will go bankrupt if 
the total amount of debt obligations exceeds its asset value.  Assume that 
issuing a secured debt is costless and that creditor monitoring is impossible. 
When Creditor 2’s loan is secured and Firm takes precaution, only 
$500 will be left to repay the loan in case of investment failure.  So 
Creditor 2 will charge $1,500 as the interest of the loan.136  Accordingly, 
Firm will undertake Project 2 and its net private gain will be 25%(7,200–
1,000–1,500+500) – 1,000 = $300.  But if Firm does not incur any cost to 
take precaution, it will have $1,000 to pay back the secured loan advanced 
by Creditor 2 since the existence of Creditor 1 does not alter the priority 
status held by the secured lender.  Hence, the loan becomes riskless and its 
interest drops to zero.  Then, we will expect Firm to invest in Project 1 and 
obtain a net gain of 50%(4,000–1,000+1,000) – 50%*50%*1,500 – 1,000 = 
$625.137  Obviously, Firm prefers investing in Project 1 and not taking 
precaution when a secured debt is used.  Therefore, the net social gain from 
this option is 4,000*50% – 1,000 – 50%*1,500 = $250. 
Conversely, if the loan is not secured, taking precaution will generate 
the same payoff for Firm as when it takes precaution and the loan is 
secured, because precaution eliminates the probability of harm and Creditor 
2 will always be Firm’s sole creditor.  But Creditor 1’s claim for damages 
will arise with 50% chance if Firm does not take precaution, and then 
Creditor 2 will be subject to pro rata distribution with Creditor 1 if its loan 
is unsecured and Firm goes bankrupt.  Aware of this risk, the unsecured 
Creditor 2 would charge Firm an interest equal to $900 should it not take 
precaution.138  As a result, secured lending not allowed, Firm will choose 
not to take precaution and invest in Project 2, earning a net gain of 
25%(7,200–1,000–900+1,000) – 25%*50%*1,500 – 1,000 = $387.5.139  
Our society, therefore, gains 7,200*25% – 1,000 – 50%*1,500 = $50. 
In this example, banning secured loans does not encourage precaution, 
 
 136.  Solve 25%(r+1,000) + 75%*500 = 1,000, where r is the amount of interest.  Note 
that Firm will play opportunistically to invest in Project 2 if the interest is set at $500, the 
solution to 50%(r+1,000) + 50%*500 = 1,000. 
 137.  In this case, Firm will not pick Project 2 since 25%(7,200–1,000+1,000) – 
25%*50%*1,500 – 1,000 = $612.5 < $625. 
 138.  Solve 25%(r+1,000) + 75%(50%*1,000+50%*1,000*2/5) = 1,000, where r is the 
amount of interest.  Note it is not incentive compatible for Firm to invest in Project 1 if the 
interest is set at $300, by solving 50%(r+1,000) + 50%(50%*1,000+50%*1,000*2/5) = 
1,000. 
 139.  Remember that Firm’s net gain, if it takes precaution, is only $300.  
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but instead leads to higher cost of capital, thus intensifying overinvestment 
incentives.  Therefore, overall social welfare is sacrificed when secured 
lending is not an available option.  But this inefficiency arises because of 
the particular investment opportunity set available to the borrower.  If the 
borrower is presented with a different opportunity set, unsecured lending 
may encourage precaution without provoking overinvestment, hence 
improving social welfare as illustrated in the next example. 
 
Example 7.  The upside of Project 2 drops to $6,700, all other 
conditions being the same as Example 6. 
Now, if the loan is secured and precaution is taken, Firm can credibly 
commit itself to Project 1 at the interest level of $500, which causes 
Creditor 2 to break even.140  Nevertheless, not taking precaution is still a 
better option insofar as the loan is secured.141  In other words, Firm, when 
using a secured debt, will make the same choice as in the previous example 
– investing in Project 1 and not taking precaution – and thus the resulting 
net social gain will also be the same as in the previous example, i.e., $250. 
On the other hand, Firm will invest in Project 1 again but choose to 
take precaution if it is barred from issuing secured debts.  Incurring the 
$500 cost for precaution, Firm can expect a net benefit of $500 from its 
investment in Project 1.142  But if it does not spend on precaution, Firm will 
have to pay the unsecured Creditor 2 an interest of $300,143 which drives its 
net gain down to 50%(4,000–1,000–300+1,000) – (50%*50%*1,500) – 
1,000 = $475.  Therefore, spending on precaution becomes a wise choice 
for Firm, which renders the net social gain up to 50%*4,000 – 1,000 – 500 
= $500.  Apparently, with a decrease in the upside of the riskier project, 
unsecured lending may encourage efficient precaution against tortious 
harm without triggering additional costs of overinvestment. 
There is yet another issue regarding the tradeoff between precaution 
inefficiency and overinvestment efficiency of secured debts.  Given a set of 
investment opportunities, the borrower’s incentive to take precaution 
diminishes as the cost of doing so increases.  While commentators often 
seem to ignore the cost effect on decisions to take precaution,144 it may 
actually force up the interest charge in a way similar to the diluting effect 
 
 140.  25%(6,700–1,000–500+500) – 1,000 = $425 < 50%(4,000–1,000–500+500) – 
1,000 = $500. 
 141.  Firm’s net gains, when taking precaution and not doing so are, respectively, 
50%(4,000–1,000–500+500) – 1,000 = $500 and 50%(4,000–1,000+1,000) – 
50%*50%*1,500 – 1,000 = $625. 
 142.  See id. 
 143.  Solve 50%(r+1,000) + 50%(50%*1,000+50%*1,000*2/5) = 1,000. 
 144.  E.g., Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1319; Bebchuk & Fried, 
Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 898-900. 
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of tort claims.  As long as the cost of precaution is to be paid out of the 
borrower’s pocket, it also reduces the borrower’s assets available for 
bankruptcy distribution to its adjusting creditors, the same as what is 
expected upon the appearance of tort creditors when no precaution is taken.  
Foreseeing less recovery when the borrower goes bankrupt, adjusting 
creditors will account for the increased risk by raising the interest rate, 
regardless of the driving force of the risk increase.  From the borrower’s 
standpoint, therefore, the rising cost of precaution can render precaution 
less appealing than staying careless and allowing tort claims to build up, 
ceteris paribus.145  This point is shown by Example 8. 
 
Example 8.  The cost of taking precaution rises to $700, all other 
conditions being the same as Example 7. 
Under the secured lending arrangement, taking precaution pushes the 
loan interest up to $2,100146 and Firm’s net gain becomes -$25.147  But if no 
cost is incurred to take precaution, Firm’s net gain will be $625 again.148  
Apparently, Firm would prefer the latter option, creating a positive social 
gain of $250, the same as in the previous example. 
When unsecured, Creditor 2 will charge an interest of $300 if Firm 
does not take precaution149 and $2,100 if it does.150  Accordingly, Firm’s net 
private gain will be, respectively, $475151 and -$25.152  Clearly, when the 
cost of taking precaution rises to $700, Firm will not be ready to incur this 
cost even though it is not allowed to issue secured debts.  The social gain is 
still 50%*4,000 – 1,000 – 50%*1,500 = $250.  Hence, in this example, our 
society should be indifferent whether secured loans are allowed. 
Therefore, just like our discussion about monitoring, when we 
consider the distortive effects of precaution decisions, no simple conclusion 
can be drawn as to the desirability of secured lending without any 
knowledge about the distribution of the borrower’s investment 
opportunities, or the cost involved in reducing the probability of accident to 
 
 145.  Note that under the limited liability regime, the borrower can externalize the costs 
of torts even when the loan is not secured.  Thus, investing in precaution forces the borrower 
to bear all the costs of avoiding the harm, but only enjoy part of the benefits.  Consequently, 
it may not pay for the borrower to invest in precaution despite the investment being socially 
optimal.  
 146.  Solve 25%(r + 1,000) + 75%*300 = 1,000, where r is the amount of interest.  Note 
it is not incentive compatible for Firm to invest in Project 1 if the interest is set at $700, by 
solving 50%(r+1,000) + 50%*300 = 1,000. 
 147.  25%(6,700–1,000–2,100+300) – 1,000 = -$25. 
 148.  50%(4,000+1,000–1,000) – 50%*50%*1,500 – 1,000 = $625. 
 149.  See supra note 143. 
 150.  See supra note 146. 
 151.  See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 152.  See supra note 147. 
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an optimal level.153 
V. OTHER ISSUES 
In the preceding parts of this Article, the analysis centers on the 
impact of secured lending on debtors’ overinvesting incentives.  Below I 
will briefly discuss another two topics appearing in the literature about the 
efficiency of secured lending and explore whether they are affected 
likewise by the primary paradox of secured lending. 
A. A Note on Underinvestment 
Underinvestment refers to the situation where, due to pre-existing debt 
obligations, the borrower is willing to forego some efficient investment 
opportunities with positive NPV.  Since it was identified in the late 
1970s,154 law scholars have widely recognized its presence and appreciated 
the role of secured lending in its solution.155  In particular, Professors 
Bebchuk and Fried believe that underinvestment is a main efficiency cost if 
the full priority system is transformed into a partial priority one.156 
With an analysis similar to the one in Part III. B., we may conclude 
that secured debts, coupled with full priority, are able to assuage 
underinvestment when the borrower’s investment opportunity set includes 
at least one socially efficient project.  First, if both projects are socially 
efficient, yet the borrower is not interested in either for lack of net private 
gain, a secured debt raises the net earnings from these projects as the 
interest charges, RC1 and RC2, shrink, hence improving the probability that 
one of these projects will be undertaken.  That is to say, secured debts 
 
 153.  Needless to say, as discussed in the previous section, the cost involved in the use of 
secured debts is another factor. 
 154.  For the seminal work on underinvestment, see Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of 
Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977) (presenting an explanation for why firms 
limit borrowing even with a tax advantage). 
 155.  Stulz and Johnson first indicate that secured lending facilitates the solution to the 
underinvestment problem.  See Rene M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An Analysis of Secured 
Debt, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 515-17 (1985) (noting that financing a project with secured debt 
often involves lower monitoring and contracting costs).  For analysis of this point in the 
legal literature, see, for example, Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 238, 248-49 
(illustrating the subset of cases where investment could be financed by the issuance of 
secured debt). 
 156.  See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 919-20 (illustrating when 
shareholders may choose to undertake an efficient activity).  The author’s illustration and 
description of the situation revealed their interest in the underinvestment problem although 
the term was not explicitly mentioned.  They also believe that this should be a rare situation 
but did not elaborate on the basis for their belief. 
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make it easier to satisfy either the combination of inequalities (7) and (8) or 
of (2) and (9).  Second, if only Project 1 is efficient, and unsecured 
borrowing will not lead to a net gain to the borrower from investing in 
either project, secured lending may incentivize it to undertake the efficient 
project by reducing RC1, the interest of the loan.  In other words, secured 
lending elevates the likelihood that inequalities (7) and (8) are jointly 
satisfied.  Of course, in the latter situation, the smaller amount of interest 
accompanied by a secured debt may propel the investment in the inefficient 
Project 2 as well when it engenders a concurrent fulfillment of both (2) and 
(9) as the borrower is faced with certain sets of investment opportunities.  
Law scholars have long been aware of the dual efficiency effects of 
granting security interests to adjusting creditors.157 
A necessary condition for secured lending to exert its positive 
influence on underinvestment is, again, W-N-RN ≥ p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-
RN+W].  When W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W] and p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-
RN+W] ≤ p2[x2-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W], the debtor will invest in Project 2 even 
if secured borrowing is unavailable.  Likewise, when W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-
RC2(0)-N-RN+W] but p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] > p2[x2-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W], 
the debtor will invest in Project 1 even when it can borrow only on 
unsecured basis.  This is because, given p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] > p2[x2-
C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W], p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] must be greater than p2[x2-C-
RC2(0)-N-RN+W],158 so W-N-RN < p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W].  Put 
differently, as long as W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W], the debtor will 
always invest in some project, rather than abstaining from all 
opportunities.159  Therefore, it seems that the merit of secured lending in 
overcoming underinvestment occurs when p2x2, the expected value of the 
riskier investment project, is relatively low. 
For the purpose of this Article, it is most important to note that the 
merit of secured lending in overcoming underinvestment relies again on the 
presence of nonadjusting creditors.  In other words, this efficient aspect of 
secured lending finds itself subject to the primary paradox too.  This point 
is evident from the fact that the borrower’s incentive of investment is 
determined by its entire cost of credit, RCi + RN.  Secured debts reduce this 
cost only because we have assumed that RN is fixed.  If, instead, the 
unsecured creditor raises its interest rate after a secured debt is issued to 
 
 157.  E.g., Triantis, Free-Cash-Flow, supra note 77, at 2162-64 (giving an example 
situation of the tradeoff between first-in-time and later-in-time priority rules). 
 158.  Since RC1(0) < RC2(0), p2[x2-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] > p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W]. 
 159.  Admittedly, when only Project 1 is socially efficient, the debtor may nonetheless 
opt for Project 2 and forego the efficient project when W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W].  
But this is considered as a problem of overinvestment instead of underinvestment, and 
secured lending facilitates its solution, as discussed in Part IV.A. 
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other creditors, the overall cost of capital stays unaltered.  Then, secured 
lending cannot be a cure for underinvestment. 
B. A Note on Screening Efficiency 
Professor Buckley asserts that the screening costs of unsecured 
creditors will be reduced if security interests are granted to some creditors 
because “unsecured creditors can usually assume that Bu = 0 and need not 
estimate how many other claims will be made on bankruptcy.”160  So, under 
secured lending, only a smaller number of secured creditors have to engage 
in screening with respect to their bankruptcy rights.  This argument, as 
Professor Triantis has precisely pointed out, is overly simplified since 
unsecured creditors often do receive partial repayment of their claims in 
bankruptcy.161  It is plausible that, after the issuance of secured debts, 
unsecured creditors tend to screen the borrower more intensively.  They 
will have to bear increased risk when other lenders enjoy a priority in 
bankruptcy, so every extra dollar spent on screening will preserve their 
stakes by a greater margin.162 
While both Professors Buckley and Triantis seem to believe that when 
secured debts are issued, the unsecured creditors’ will screen less 
extensively because “they may be able to rely on the screening activity of 
the collateral given to prior lenders,”163 I remain suspicious of the validity 
of this postulation.  Two factors contribute to the fact that unsecured 
creditors may duplicate the screening efforts of secured creditors.  First, the 
outcomes of screening can be concealed as private information so that there 
is no guarantee that secured creditors’ screening will be a public good to all 
creditors.  In other words, unsecured creditors will need to collect 
information by themselves despite the screening efforts of prior secured 
creditors.  Second, unsecured creditors are probably unwilling to dispense 
with the evaluation of collaterals when such information is kept private by 
secured lenders.  Secured creditors may hold a sufficient equity cushion 
such that unsecured creditors might still be able to rely on the collaterals 
for partial repayment of their claims in bankruptcy.  In addition, if, as 
 
 160.  Buckley, supra note 4, at 1424.  Professor Buckley uses Bu to denote the value of 
the unsecured creditors’ bankruptcy claim at default.  See id. at 1399 (defining Bu). 
 161.  Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 251 (commenting that creditors, if they did 
assume that they would receive nothing in bankruptcy, would undervalue a firm’s debt and 
any resulting loss would offset what was saved from screening costs). 
 162.  Professor Triantis expressed a similar concern, though he may not agree that the 
adjusting unsecured creditors’ overall screening costs would rise accordingly.  See id. 
(pointing out that the unsecured creditors may be focused on unencumbered assets or the 
firm’s general financial health while relying on previous screening activity). 
 163.  Id. 
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Professor Triantis has suggested, unsecured creditors can truly count on the 
screening of collaterals by prior lenders, hence lowering the total screening 
costs, then we should see secured debts issued as early as possible in the 
debtor’s business life, which, unfortunately, finds no empirical support.164  
Thus, augmented intensity plus comparable extensity implies increased 
screening costs for the unsecured creditors who adjust their screening 
activities when other lenders are secured. 
From the social perspective, what matters is always the entire cost of 
capital rather than the partial cost associated with secured credits.  So, just 
like any other type of capital cost, the overall screening cost will not 
decline, even if secured creditors incur lower screening costs, unless some 
unsecured creditors do not expand their expenditure on screening as a result 
of secured lending.  If such unsecured creditors do exist, they are very 
likely the nonadjusting creditors affected by the distributional effects of 
secured debts.  In this sense, even the screening efficiency does not seem to 
be relieved from the primary paradox of secured lending. 
CONCLUSION 
Is there a less uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in 
bankruptcy?  The answer may be a qualified yes.  On the one hand, since 
Professors Bebchuk and Fried did not identify the advantage of secured 
lending in moderating overinvestment with the presence of nonadjusting 
creditors,165 the case for the priority of secured claims may not be as 
troubling as they have perceived.  In comparison with underinvestment, 
overinvestment is probably more intractable through renegotiation among 
the parties.166  So dispiriting the latter can be a bigger merit than relieving 
the former.  On the other hand, however, this paper has also shown that 
even this efficiency benefit relies heavily on the distributional effects of 
 
 164.  See Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 22 (arguing that the validity of the 
staggering-debt explanation is questionable, as data is sparse and those statistics that are 
available fail to support it).   
 165.  They believe the only desirable investment activity that will be sacrificed after the 
priority of secured claims is restricted will be, essentially, the one susceptible to 
underinvestment.  See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 920 (discussing 
only the situation in which a firm may need additional investment).  So the benefit of 
controlling overinvestment explored in this paper is distinct from those efficiency gains they 
have considered. 
 166.  Renegotiation has long been considered a solution to underinvestment.  See 
Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 920-21 (noting that creditors may find it 
in their interest to modify their contractual rights and reduce the size of their claims, so that 
they are able to receive full payment on reduced claims rather than no payment on their full 
claims); Myers, supra note 154, at 158 (presenting when and how a debt contract might be 
renegotiated). 
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secured lending, and that secured debts not only tame the overinvesting 
incentive but can also inspire it under a different set of conditions. 
As elaborated in this Article, the virtue of secured debts in 
discouraging overinvestment under some circumstances should be 
weighed, first of all, against its vice in stimulating overinvestment under 
others.  Further trade-offs exist between this virtue and the dampened 
monitoring efforts, distorted precaution decisions, as well as costly 
perfection requirements and complicated bankruptcy dynamics.  In view of 
all these hurdles before an efficient employment of secured financing, any 
extra relief for the uneasy case of the priority of secured credits may appear 
insignificant. 
The two paradoxes examined in this Article exhibit the complexity of 
assessing the welfare effects of secured lending.  The distribution of 
borrowers’ investment opportunities, lenders’ monitoring abilities, the costs 
necessary for optimal level of precaution, the costs of issuing secured 
debts, and their ramifications in the bankruptcy procedure, among other 
things, will all exert influence on the overall efficiency of secured lending.  
Usually, when lawmakers do not have sufficient information about the 
costs and benefits of certain activities, it is advisable to make the person 
who decides to take action bear all the burdens and enjoy all the rewards of 
his or her decision.  But in the current case, this strategy is not going to 
work.  The quantity of agency costs involved in debt financing varies as the 
parties that shoulder these costs vary.  If the borrower is forced to 
internalize the entire agency costs, the total amount of such costs may 
become greater than what it otherwise would be when nonadjusting 
creditors share part of these costs.  In other words, internalization, though it 
eliminates distribution, may downsize the social welfare pie at the same 
time. 
Although we are, by and large, still agnostic about the significance of 
secured lending in curing adverse incentives relative to its impact on 
distributing agency costs, a more recent study by Professor Listokin has 
shed important light on the severity of distributional effects in practice.167  
Based on a carefully designed empirical strategy, he has managed to 
demonstrate that secured debts are less frequently used by industries with 
large, uninsurable tort liabilities, probably due to the considerable costs in 
bankruptcy.168  This finding, however, is not necessarily good news for 
advocates of security interests with bankruptcy priority.  If Professor 
 
 167.  Listokin, supra note 2 (providing a study on the redistributional theory in 
bankruptcy). 
 168.  Id. at 1077 (concluding that secured debt is the least attractive debt when the 
probability of liquidity defaults is relatively high, such as in the case of massive tort 
bankruptcies). 
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Listokin’s observation is correct, then the primary paradox this paper has 
reviewed would predict that the efficiency created by secured lending, 
should it exist, is trivial as well.  In that case, the controversy about the 
priority status of secured claims in bankruptcy itself becomes normatively 
unimportant.  Another implication is that the proprietary aspect of security 
interests might be more relevant to their allocative efficiency.  Thus, the 
welfare effects of security interests, when stripped of priority, probably 
warrant a meticulous probe in future.169 
 
 
 169.  For instance, one question in need of further exploration is whether a secured 
creditor’s threat to foreclose becomes less credible.  See supra note 53 (discussing factors 
affecting the credibility of threatening foreclosure as a deterrence to debtor misbehaviors).  
Relatedly, reconsideration may also be warranted about the very idea of separating the 
property and priority sides of security interests.  It is worth noting that property interests on 
borrowers’ assets, in general, enjoy a status senior to debt obligations in bankruptcy 
proceedings.  See Baird, supra note 28, at 120 (pointing to § 365(h) of the Bankruptcy 
Code). 
